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AN ANALYSIS OF THE ADVANTAGES OF NON-MARKET
BASED APPROACHES FOR DETERMINING CHAPTER 11
CRAMDOWN RATES: A LEGAL AND FINANCIAL
PERSPECTIVE
Thomas S. Green*
I. INTRODUCTION
As litigation involving corporate matters became increasingly
more technical in the twentieth century, principles of corporate finance began to play a major role in shaping many judicial opinions
involving corporate, securities, and bankruptcy law. The theoretical
underpinnings of the bankruptcy laws and the federal securities laws
have necessitated a certain degree of judicial deference towards expert
witnesses with professional backgrounds in finance and accounting.
Not surprisingly, bankruptcy courts in New York and Delaware frequently hear legal issues relating to these developments as distressed
businesses tend to exhibit fairly complex capital structures and large
amounts of secured debt. One of these issues is whether or not a court
should defer to the credit markets in determining the appropriate rate
of interest used to calculate deferred payments to secured lenders in a
chapter 11 plan. This Comment will discuss how and why, in making
such a determination, the concept of market efficiency is crucial.
In Till v. SCS Credit Corp., the Supreme Court of the United States
addressed the issue of how a bankruptcy court should determine the
interest rate used to discount deferred payments to secured lenders in
a chapter 13 plan of debt readjustment.1 The plurality in Till held that
the United States Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) requires judges to

* J.D., 2015, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2009, University of Pennsylvania. Special thanks to Professor Stephen Lubben for his assistance with the topic selection and comment drafting process. Additional thanks to Fouad Kurdi and Richard
Holm for their comments and feedback. The following reflects the author’s views
alone and does not represent the opinion of any law firm or other organization affiliated with the author.
1
Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2003) (holding that the formula approach
must be used to determine the interest rate paid to secured lenders in a chapter 13
plan of debt readjustment).

1151

GREEN (DO NOT DELETE)

1152

5/18/2016 1:34 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1151

apply the “formula approach.”2 This method involves selecting a relevant risk-free rate and adjusting upwards in accordance with the
debtor’s risk of default in order to ensure that the present value of the
future cash payments equals the allowed secured claim.3
Since 2003, when the Till opinion was written, courts and commentators have debated its applicability in chapter 11 cases,4 specifically with regard to Section 1129(b) of the Code. The bankruptcy bar’s
interest in this topic was reinvigorated in 2014 when Judge Robert
Drain of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District
of New York issued a lengthy ruling heavily devoted to secured lender
treatment in a chapter 11 cramdown.5 Interest rate determination was
one of the primary contested matters when both the first and the 1.5
lien noteholders6 asserted that Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the
Code mandated a higher rate than the one offered under the plan.7
More specifically, they advocated for the “coerced loan approach”: the
rate that a creditor could obtain if he were to foreclose on the collateral and reinvest the proceeds in a loan of comparable duration and
risk to the one issued to the debtor under the plan.8 Notwithstanding
the fact that the Supreme Court had already rejected the coerced loan
approach in the chapter 13 context in Till, the indenture trustees asserted that Till’s holding did not apply to chapter 11 cases and that
market rates should be used as proxies instead.9 The debtor (“Momentive”), on the other hand, arrived at the appropriate discount rate
2

Id. at 479–80.
Id. at 479.
4
See generally, e.g., Gary W. Marsh & Matthew W. Weiss, Chapter 11 Interest Rates
After Till, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 209 (2010); Jason A. Pill, Untill the Footnote Was Written:
The Effect of Till v. SCS Credit Corporation On 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2), 26 EMORY BANKR.
DEV. J. 267 (2010); Mark J. Thompson & Katie M. McDonough, Lost in Translation: Till
v. SCS Credit Corp. and the Mistaken Transfer of a Consumer Bankruptcy Repayment Formula
to Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 893 (2015); Daniel R. Wong,
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy and Cramdowns: Adopting a Contract Rate Approach, 106 NW. U. L.
REV. 1927 (2012).
5
In re MPM Silicones, LLC, No. 14-22503-rdd, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3926, at *1
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014), aff’d, 531 B.R. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). In the text of this
Comment, the author will hereinafter refer to In re MPM Silicones, LLC as “Momentive.”
6
After the senior secured creditor is paid in full, 1.5 lien noteholders are entitled
to satisfaction of their claims with the remaining proceeds of the sale of collateral and
may be issued in connection with an exchange offer. See, e.g., Matthew DiLallo, Chesapeake Energy Corporation Considers Another Tactic to Address Looming Debt Maturities, THE
MOTLEY FOOL (Apr. 19, 2016, 12:30 PM) http://www.fool.com/
investing/general/2016/03/18/chesapeake-energy-corporation-considers-anotherta.aspx.
7
In re MPM Silicones, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3926, at *71.
8
Id. at *71, 82.
9
Id.
3
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by taking the seven-year treasury yield and adjusting this figure by a
risk-premium associated with the restructured debtor.10 The debtor
arrived at this figure using the formula approach, the very same
method endorsed by the Till Court eleven years earlier.11 In confirming the plan, Judge Drain rejected the coerced loan approach as inconsistent with the policy behind the Code.12 Notably, he held that Till
is not only binding precedent in the chapter 13 context, but in the
chapter 11 context as well.13
The confirmation of Momentive’s cramdown plan elicited widespread coverage and attention from the financial and legal press, distressed debt investors, and financial sponsors.14 Since incremental
changes in the discount rate can amount to millions of dollars for secured lenders in chapter 11 cases, this was far from unexpected.15
Moreover, since the various financial institutions involved in the chapter 11 process are frequently willing to devote a substantial number of
resources to litigate matters such as these, the issue of cramdown rate
determination in chapter 11 will likely be heard by a United States
Court of Appeals16 in the near future.17 Accordingly, this Comment
hopes to serve as a guide for bankruptcy and appellate courts alike

10

Id. at *70–71.
Id.
12
See id. at *73–74.
13
In re MPM Silicones, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3926, at *72–73.
14
See, e.g., Stephen J. Lubben, Judge’s Ruling Could Affect Bondholders in Corporate
Bankruptcies, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2014, 3:49 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2014/08/28/judges-ruling-could-affect-bondholders-in-corporate-bankruptcies/; Nathan Vardi, Leon Black’s Apollo Global Management Keeps Winning Battles And Outmaneuvering Creditors, FORBES (Aug. 28, 2014, 8:25 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
nathanvardi/2014/08/28/leon-blacks-apollo-global-management-keeps-winning-battles-and-outmaneuvering-creditors/#415a8101356d; Matt Wirz, Momentive Ruling
Shakes Up Debt Markets, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 28, 2014, 10:14 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
moneybeat/2014/08/28/momentive-ruling-shakes-up-debt-markets/. This reaction
was not surprising as Judge Drain made numerous determinations that could potentially have a substantial impact on the rights of secured lenders in chapter 11 bankruptcies; most significantly, the standard for determining whether an indenture entitles a creditor to a “make-whole” call premium upon repayment of principal in
bankruptcy.
15
For example, the outstanding principal on Momentive’s first and 1.5 lien replacement notes is approximately $1.3 billion.
16
This includes United States District Courts exercising appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2012).
17
Indeed, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
affirmed Judge Drain’s opinion as this Comment was being written. U.S. Bank N.A. v.
Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y (In re MPM Silicones, LLC), 531 B.R. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
The case is currently on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.
11
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when they are confronted with the task of calculating the appropriate
interest rate in a chapter 11 cramdown plan. Unlike other commentators who have addressed this topic in the past, this Comment seeks to
provide a unique perspective from both a legal and financial standpoint. As determined above, the latter is of grave importance because
many courts have held that Till footnote 14 suggests that the coerced
loan approach might be ideal in chapter 11 cases if parties can demonstrate that the interest rates to be used as proxies are the product of an
“efficient market.”18 Nonetheless, courts taking footnote 14’s directive
have often applied standards that depart from the principles articulated in the “Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis,”19 patently endorsed
by the United States Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson.20 This
Comment will argue why these general principles should be relevant
to the inquiry suggested by Till footnote 14. Additionally, it will augment the Momentive court’s assertion that interest rates of exit facilities
to companies emerging from chapter 11 and comparable debtors may
not be efficient. Although footnote 14 states that it might make sense
to “ask what rate an efficient market [for loans to entities comparable
to a debtor] would produce” in chapter 11, this Comment will discuss
why this is a very difficult question to answer in practice and why such
inquiry may be futile.
Part II of this Comment will provide an overview of cramdown
plans of reorganization under Section 1129(b) of the Code. Part III
will explain the concepts of discounting and present value, and it will
examine why they are important with regard to secured creditor treatment in chapter 11. Part IV will analyze the Till decision in detail and
discuss the post-Till case law on the requirements of Section
1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II), most notably Momentive and Bank of Montreal v.
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re American HomePatient,
Inc.)21 by focusing on two aspects of the analysis: (1) whether the court
chose to endorse the formula approach or a two-stepped coerced loan
approach; and (2) the court’s policy justifications for doing so. In cases
where the court adopted the two-stepped coerced loan approach, Part
18

See infra Part V.
See infra Part V. See also Pill, supra note 4, at 290 (“While the term ‘efficient
market’ has a commonly used definition in securities litigation, the question remains
whether bankruptcy courts will transpose the definition into the bankruptcy arena.”).
20
See, e.g., Michael Simkovic & Benjamin S. Kaminetzky, Leveraged Buyout Bankruptcies, the Problem of Hindsight Bias, and the Credit Default Swap Solution, 2011 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 118, 157 n.124 (2011) (“In the parlance of economists, the Supreme Court
has accepted the semi-strong form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis.” (citing Basic
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244 (1988))).
21
420 F.3d 559, 568 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 942 (2006).
19
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IV will examine how the court conducted its market efficiency analysis.
Part V will argue why Till should apply in chapter 11 cramdowns as a
matter of judicial economy and public policy, specifically contending
that the purpose of the cramdown rate is to ensure that the present
value of a secured lender’s future cash flows equals the amount of its
allowed secured claim and assert that this principle is no less relevant
in the chapter 11 context.
With this policy foundation established, the Comment will consider corporate finance theory in discussing why the Efficient Capital
Markets Hypothesis should be the proper standard for testing the efficiency of market rates and explain why this theory might fail when applied to credit markets relevant to a typical chapter 11 proceeding. It
is important to note that Part V does not presume to determine conclusively the efficiency of modern credit markets. Individuals with advanced degrees in finance and economics will surely publish new findings in this ever-evolving field of study. Rather, the purpose of Part V
is to address the manner in which lawyers view the concept of market
efficiency, reconcile how definition is applied in the securities context
and the chapter 11 context, and address some of the reasons why market interest rates may not be efficient. Lastly, Part VI concludes.
II. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER 11 AND CRAMDOWN PLANS OF
REORGANIZATION
Chapter 11 of the Code was designed to “strike a balance between
the need of a corporate debtor in financial hardship to be made economically sound and the desire to preserve creditors’ and stockholders’ existing legal rights to the greatest extent possible.”22 In light of
these competing policy concerns, distressed firms and their creditors
have strong incentives to work with one another in devising a plan of
restructuring and avoiding costly litigation whenever possible.23 Nevertheless, obtaining unanimous consent for a plan that proposes to
modify significantly the rights of numerous classes of creditors can be
a daunting task. Addressing this concern, the drafters of the Code
granted bankrupt businesses an extraordinary remedy—the ability to
implement a binding plan of restructuring on dissenting creditors and

22

See Wong, supra note 4, at 1931 (citing 7 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1100.01 (16th
ed. 2014)).
23
See generally 7 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1100.01 (16th ed. 2014) (“The reorganization of a corporation is not a lawsuit in the ordinary sense of a procedure designed
to settle issues between individual litigants, but a complex exercise of legal method,
corporate finance and business management.”).
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claimants alike.24
The end goal for a “Debtor In Possession”25 is to obtain plan confirmation.26 A typical chapter 11 plan involves multiple changes to the
firm’s current capital structure. Debtors often modify the rights of secured lenders by paying out the face value of their claims over an extended period of time. General unsecured creditors may receive full
or partial satisfaction of their claims27 through some combination of
immediate consideration, deferred cash compensation, equity in the
newly reorganized company, and warrants to purchase equity in the
new company. In some circumstances they may receive nothing at all.
Equityholders of the old debtor more frequently end up with nothing.28 The typical chapter 11 plan may also involve other significant
changes to the company such as management changes, operational
changes, the establishment of a litigation trust to fund the plan, and

24

See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)–(b) (2012). Under the Trust Indenture Act
(TIA), which governs the issuance of certain registered debt securities in the United
States, all material changes to a bond’s indenture require unanimous consent of a
company’s bondholders. See Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 316(b), 15 U.S.C. §
77ppp(b) (2012). The Bankruptcy Code enables a bond issuer to circumvent the unanimity requirement of the TIA with respect to certain debt securities.
25
Under chapters 7 and 13 of the Code, a trustee is appointed to monitor and
distribute the assets of the debtor and to represent the interests of general unsecured
creditors. Generally speaking, trustees are not appointed in chapter 11. Rather, the
debtor maintains operational control of its assets and becomes the “debtor in possession” (DIP). A DIP is defined as a “debtor except when a person that has qualified
under section 322 of this title is serving as a trustee in the case.” 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1).
The DIP assumes all the rights and responsibilities of a trustee in bankruptcy and owes
certain fiduciary duties to its creditors normally not owed outside of bankruptcy law.
See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107, 1108.
26
In recent years, the use of “363 sales” has largely supplanted traditional chapter
11 plans and has become a widespread form of corporate restructuring. Broadly speaking, a DIP can sell all or substantially all of its assets to a new buyer “free and clear of
any interest in such property of an entity other than the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 363(f).
The buyer takes clean title to the assets, the business continues as a going concern
under the control of the buyer, and the seller then distributes the cash proceeds to its
creditors through a liquidating plan. Although the Code’s drafters did not expressly
codify this procedure, it remains the predominant form of “corporate reorganization”
today. While some scholars have supported 363 sales as a powerful tool that facilitates
the continuation of a distressed business as a going concern, others have criticized
their widespread use for numerous reasons beyond the scope of this paper. See generally
Stephen J. Lubben & Stephanie Ben-Ishai, Sales or Plans: A Comparative Account of the
“New” Corporate Reorganization, 56 MCGILL L.J. 591 (2011). But see Lynn M. LoPucki &
Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2007).
27
For example, if an unsecured bondholder is owed $1000 in principal, it is legally
permissible under the Code to force such bondholder to accept consideration worth
substantially less than that. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(1) (a plan may “impair or
leave unimpaired any class of claims, secured or unsecured, or of interests”).
28
See id.
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sales of various segments of the debtor-in-possession’s (DIP’s) business.29
For a consensual chapter 11 plan to be confirmed by a bankruptcy
judge, it must meet the requirements of Section 1129(a) of the Code.30
Confirmation is largely dependent upon approval by each class of creditors.31 More specifically, a voting class of creditors is deemed to have
accepted the plan if half of the class members and two-thirds of the
dollar value of the class’ claims vote in favor of such plan.32
Despite a debtor’s failure to obtain the necessary votes under Section 1129(a)(8), it may nonetheless force the dissenting creditors to
be bound by the plan’s terms. This tactic is generally referred to as
“cramdown.”33 In addition to meeting all of the requirements of Section 1129(a), a cramdown plan must also satisfy the elements of Section 1129(b).34 Broadly speaking, the two primary elements of Section
1129(b) are the requirements that the plan (1) not “unfairly discriminate” between various classes of creditors and (2) be “fair and equitable” with respect to each class of claimant.35 Section (2) of subsection
(b) defines the phrase “fair and equitable” as it applies to each general
type of claim—”secured claims,” “unsecured claims,” and “interests.”36
Before discussing how Section 1129(b) defines “fair and equitable” with respect to secured creditors, one must first examine how the
Code defines a “secured claim.” Section 506 states that a secured claim
is one that is “secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an
interest, or that is subject to setoff under section 553 of this title.”37 A
secured claim is secured “to the extent of the value of such creditor’s
interest in the estate’s interest in such property.”38 More succinctly, a
creditor whose claim is “secured by a lien on property in which the
29

See generally ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS 595–767 (Aspen Publishers, 6th ed. 2009) (discussing the chapter 11 plan
negotiation and confirmation process).
30
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1)–(16) lists the sixteen requirements a consensual plan
must meet in order to be confirmed. Among these is the requirement for a court to
find that the confirmation of the plan will not likely be followed by another reorganization or liquidation. § 1129(a)(11). Additionally, all classes of impaired creditors
must accept the plan. § 1129(a)(8).
31
§ 1129(a)(8).
32
§ 1126(c).
33
See generally 7 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1129.03 (16th ed. 2014).
34
11 U.S.C. 1129(b) (2012).
35
§ 1129(b)(1). In Code parlance, the term “interests” in this context refers to
equityholders of the old debtor.
36
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)–(C).
37
11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(2012).
38
Id.
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estate has an interest” is treated as a secured claimant if the value of
the property exceeds the value of the claim.39 When the debt owed to
such creditor exceeds the value of the collateral, however, the creditor’s claim is bifurcated.40 Under this scenario, the lender will assert:
(a) a secured claim in the amount of the value of the collateral itself;
and (b) an unsecured claim, if recourse exists under state law, for the
remaining portion of the debt.41 This process is also referred to as
“cramdown” or “stripdown.”42
An important exception to Section 506 exists in chapter 11. Since
a chapter 11 plan often calls for an arbitrary judicial valuation of a
creditor’s collateral for purposes of determining the status of a secured
claim, Congress enacted Section 1111(b) to protect creditors from
such a valuation.43 Outside of bankruptcy, secured lenders provide financing to a borrower with the expectation that they can look to the
value of the collateral to satisfy their claims upon a default. The satisfaction of their claims comes from the cash proceeds of the sale of collateral, and no judicial valuation is necessary. When a debtor retains
control over the collateral, however, a bankruptcy judge will hear expert witness testimony in order to calculate the estimated value of the
collateral for purposes of determining what portion of a creditor’s
claim is secured and what portion is unsecured.44 Because this process
undermines a secured lender’s expectations under state law, Section
1111(b) provides creditors with an alternative route. With the
“1111(b) election,” secured creditors have the option of waiving a deficiency claim—even if recourse was never permitted by state law—and
treating the entire balance as secured to protect against an unfavorable
valuation.45

39

Id.
Id.
41
Id.
42
For the remainder of this Comment, the term “cramdown” will refer to a chapter 11 plan under Section 1129(b) of the Code. The term “stripdown” will refer to the
process of claims bifurcation under Section 506(a).
43
See 7 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1111.03[1] (16th ed. 2014) (“Congress took the
position that disposition in a chapter 11 case of a creditor’s collateral was not like disposition in a liquidation case because of the opportunity in chapter 11 for a disposition
based on judicial valuation. Section 1111(b) thus attempts to balance the general distaste and dissatisfaction with judicial valuations of property with the need to bring
some reckoning to all debtor-creditor relations. It does this by allowing secured creditors, in most situations, to elect how their claim is treated. The consequences of that
election are far-reaching.”).
44
See id.
45
11 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (2012). Failure to make the “1111(b) election” provides
secured lenders with the ability to participate in multiple voting classes.
40
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With the proper definition of a secured claim established, the
cramdown requirements of Section 1129(b) become easier to understand. In the cramdown setting in chapter 11, “fair and equitable”
treatment of a secured claim includes the requirement that:
“each holder of [a secured claim] receive on account of such
claim deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount
of such claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, of
at least the value of such holder’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property.”46
This allowed amount will differ depending on whether the secured
claimant proceeds under Section 506(a) or Section 1111(b), as will the
amount of interest owed.47
When a plan calls for an immediate lump-sum cash payment to a
secured creditor, application of Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) is
straightforward: the debtor-in-possession must pay the full value of the
allowed secured claim if the cramdown plan is to be confirmed. Often,
however, a distressed business cannot afford to pay these claims in full
on the effective date of a plan. As a result, the secured lender is
granted a note in lieu of a lump-sum payment.48
Section
1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) mandates that the noteholder receive additional
compensation for these deferred payments.49 A note fails to meet the
requirements of Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) if it “bears no interest
or if it bears insufficient interest to discount the payment to the allowed
amount of the claim. In the language of the Code, the property thus
given—the note—does not ‘have value, as of the effective date,’ of the
allowed amount of the claim.”50 Despite universal agreement that the
“time value of money” must be taken into consideration in any
cramdown plan providing for deferred payments, courts remain divided on the issue of how to determine the proper interest rate. The
Comment’s remainder will focus in detail on this topic.

46

§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (emphasis added).
Under Section 1111(b), the creditor’s recovery is capped at the nominal value
of the claim. See infra Part III.
48
See, e.g., U.S. Bank N.A. v. Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y (In re MPM Silicones,
LLC), 531 B.R. 321, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
49
7 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1129.03 (16th ed. 2014) (quoting 11 U.S.C. §
1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II)(2012)) (emphasis added).
50
Id.
47
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III. OVERVIEW OF DISCOUNTING AND THE PRESENT VALUE OF A NOTE
In determining the “value” of a secured creditor’s note under a
chapter 11 plan, a court must discount the cash flows generated by the
note.51 Since the Code mandates that any deferred cash payments must
equal the total value of the secured claim if it were paid in full today, a
court must “translate all future cash flows into ‘today dollars.’ Only by
making this adjustment can [a court] directly compare the amounts.”52
When a secured creditor receives a note as part of a cramdown
plan, the constant cash flows generated by such note can be referred
to as an “annuity” in financial-speak.53 These payments have the effect
of reducing the amount of principal owed by the debtor at the end of
each period.54 In each subsequent period, a greater portion of the payment will offset the principal, a process known as “amortization.”55
As stated in Part II, the present value of the cash flows generated
by the note must equal the “allowed amount” of the secured lender’s
claim. In order to calculate the present value of the future payments,
each payment is “discounted” back to “today dollars” based on when
such payment is received. The present value of the note is simply the
sum of the present values of each payment generated by the note. With
the interest rate “r,” time period “t,” and the constant payment “C,”
one can calculate this sum by applying the following formula:

51

See id.
STEPHEN J. LUBBEN, CORPORATE FINANCE 23 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 1st
ed. 2014).
53
Id. at 29.
54
See id.
55
RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS, & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 44–45 (Michele Janicek et al. eds., 9th ed. 2008). In the case of a
replacement note granted to a secured lender in chapter 11, the principal is simply
the allowed secured claim. Id.
52
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Because the Code mandates that the “PV” of the cash flows must
equal the allowed secured claim, a constant, determining “C” and “r”
is most relevant. The equation can be rearranged to solve for this required annual payment to the secured creditor under the plan as a
function of the discount rate “r”:
Figure 2: Allowed Secured Claim Under Section 506 as an
Annuity

Figure 3: Required Annual Payments to a Secured Creditor via a
Note with Constant Payments

C=

56

r * Secured Claim

1 
1
t
 (1 + r) 

LUBBEN, supra note 52, at 29. If the note calls for periodic interest payments,
followed by payment of principal at the maturity date, the formula can be modified by
adding a term that discounts the principal at maturity (most corporate bonds are structured this way). The “yield,” “r,” represents the rate of return on the note while “C” is
the nominal value of the coupon payments. Any increase in the bond’s present value,
or price, must be accompanied by a corresponding decrease in the yield. Regardless
of whether the replacement note is structured as an annuity or a bond, the allowed
secured claim must equal the present value of the future cash flows generated by such
instrument. Id. at 66–67.
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This formula reveals that the each payment must equal the allowed secured claim divided by the annuity formula from Figure 1 with
constant payments of one dollar and discount rate “r.” A more complex mathematical analysis of this formula will show that an increase in
the interest rate “r” will always lead to a lower present value of an annuity.57 Since the required annual payment to the secured lender is
equal to the allowed secured claim divided by the present value of an
annuity with payments of one dollar, it follows that a decrease in the
present value of the annuity results in a larger required payment to the
secured creditor. The formula above can be simplified by referring to
“one over the present value of the annuity with constant payments of
$1” as the “discount factor” given an interest rate “r” and “t” number
of payments. Based on the above, we see that C increases as the discount factor increases.
Figure 4: Simplified Formula
C = Secured Claim x Discount Factor
When a secured creditor chooses to make an 1111(b) election,
the calculation entails an additional element. In addition to receiving
cash flows whose present value equals that of the collateral, a secured
lender must also receive cash flows totaling the nominal value of the
allowed claim.58 The formula changes accordingly:59
Figure 5: Value of a Secured Lender’s Note Payments with
1111(b) Election


Secured Claim 
C = Max Collateral Value x Discount Factor,

t



58

See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (2012).
It is important to note that in a Section 1111(b) scenario, the lender’s allowed
secured claim is not necessarily equal to the value of the underlying collateral.
59
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More frequently, corporate bonds are structured in a way that provides investors with semi-annual interest payments, or “coupons,” and
repayment of principal at maturity.60 When these debt instruments are
freely tradable on a secondary market, the actual rate of return can
differ from the coupon.61 For example, a six percent note would entitle
the holder to semi-annual coupon payments of thirty dollars. The present value formula is the same as in Figure 1; however, an additional
term must be added to the equation to account for the present value
of the $1000 principal at maturity.
Figure 6: Bond Pricing Formula

∗ 1
1,000
1

1
1

In an active secondary market, the purchase price a buyer is willing to pay for the note is simply the present value of these payments.
The interest rate, indicated by “r,” or the “yield,” is the discount rate
that sets the present value of the coupons and principal equal to the
price. If a rational investor perceives the six percent bond to be less
risky than its coupon warrants, it will pay a premium for the debt instrument. Accordingly, the yield will fall below six percent. Under this
formula, price and yield are inversely related. In the context of a chapter 11 cramdown, if “C” is equal to “r,” the note will trade at 100% of
the value of the secured claim. If “C” exceeds “r,” the debt will trade
at a premium.
In corporate finance, calculating the appropriate yield is relatively
straightforward: in order to ensure that the equation in Figure 1 balances out, note payments should be discounted at a rate that focuses
on the likelihood of repayment.62 Aside from the firm-specific risk,
some other factors to consider include duration, inflation, and the

60
61
62

LUBBEN, supra note 52, at 29
Id.
See generally LUBBEN, supra note 52, at 35–49.
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value of any underlying collateral.63 An interest rate that properly incorporates these factors is more likely to provide an accurate valuation
of the note itself.64 Arriving at the proper figure under the supervision
of a bankruptcy court, however, remains a divisive issue. Part IV will
discuss how courts have addressed the competing approaches for determining the proper rates within the chapter 13 and chapter 11 contexts.
IV. TILL AND THE CASES THAT FOLLOW
The seminal case addressing the competing methods for interest
rate determination is Till v. SCS Credit Corp.65 Although this case deals
with cramming down a secured lender in chapter 13 as opposed to
chapter 11, the take-away from Part III is equally relevant in each instance: secured lenders will always favor the approach that yields the
highest “C.” Moreover, chapter 13 is similar to chapter 11 in that it
provides individuals and households with the ability to restructure
their debts under the protection of the bankruptcy court.66 A typical
chapter 13 plan consists of three or five years of constant payments to
secured and unsecured creditors alike.67 Unlike in chapter 11, however, the requirements for plan confirmation are purely statutory, and
no voting is necessary.68 If a debtor meets the requirements of Section
1325 of the Code, a court will confirm his or her plan.69 The rights of
secured creditors in chapter 13 are addressed in Section
1325(a)(5)(B). As in chapter 11, secured claims must be paid in full
over the course of the plan.70 Also, like chapter 11, the statute “does
not mention the term ‘discount rate’ or the world ‘interest.’”71 Still,
the Supreme Court had previously held that, with regard to deferred
payments to secured creditors, courts must “discount . . . [a] stream of
deferred payments back to the[ir] present dollar value.”72 The only
contested issue going into Till was the specific interest rate required to
calculate these deferred payments.73

63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Id.
See id.
541 U.S. 465 (2004).
See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1330 (2012).
See § 1322(a)–(d).
§ 1325(a).
Id.
§ 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).
Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 473 (2004).
Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464, 472 n.8 (1993).
Till, 541 U.S. at 473.
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Since Till was decided, federal courts remain divided as to
whether or not its holding applies in chapter 11. Moreover, courts and
commentators have noted that because the opinion was a plurality, its
precedential value is debatable since it is unclear how exactly the Court
would rule on this issue in the future.74 Nonetheless, because most
courts have relied on this case to guide their calculation in the chapter
11 context, Till is always a good starting point for any cramdown rate
analysis.
A. Till v. SCS Credit Corp.: SCOTUS Adopts the Formula Approach in
Chapter 13
In Till, the petitioners filed for chapter 13 bankruptcy protection
in 1999.75 The petitioners’ chapter 13 plan provided that they would
pay “interest on the secured portion of respondent’s claim at a rate of
9.5% per year.”76 The respondent, an automobile lender with a purchase money security interest in the debtors’ truck,77 contended that it
was entitled to a rate of twenty-one percent because this was the rate
“it would [have] obtain[ed] if it could [have] foreclose[d] on the vehicle and reinvest[ed] the proceeds in loans of equivalent duration
and risk as the loan” granted to petitioners—the coerced loan rate.78
After a lengthy and convoluted appeals process, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine which approach should be used for
calculating the discount rate on a secured lender’s deferred plan payments in chapter 13.79 The Court addressed four methods of interest
rate determination.
1. The Coerced Loan Approach
The coerced loan approach, advocated by the secured lenders,
looks to the market for loans to debtors of comparable risk.80 More
specifically, courts would look at the interest rates “the creditor could
have obtained if it had foreclosed on the loan, sold the collateral, and
reinvested the proceeds in loans of equivalent duration and risk.”81

74

See, e.g., Wong, supra note 4, at 1944–45 (“The lack of a majority rationale weakens the precedential effect of Till in non-Chapter 13 situations, especially because each
opinion endorses a different method for determining interest rates.”).
75
Till, 541 U.S. at 470.
76
Id. at 471.
77
Commonly referred to as a “PMSI.”
78
Till, 541 U.S. at 471 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
79
Id. at 473.
80
Id. at 471.
81
Id. at 472.
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Writing for the plurality, Justice Stevens rejected this approach in
Till because it is “complicated, imposes significant evidentiary costs,
and aims to make each individual creditor whole rather than to ensure
the debtor’s payments have the required present value.”82 The plurality
also added that this method would require bankruptcy courts to conduct an inquiry far removed from their usual task of “evaluating debtors’ financial circumstances and the feasibility of their debt adjustment
plans.”83 Finally, Justice Stevens added that this approach would overcompensate creditors as market interest rates include elements of
profit, transaction costs, and other factors that are “no longer relevant
in the context of court-administered and court-supervised cram down
loans.”84
2. The Presumptive Contract Rate Approach
The presumptive contract rate approach is a “slightly modified
version of the [coerced loan approach].”85 This method begins with
the interest rate on a debtor’s initial loan.86 Recognizing, however, that
loans to bankrupt debtors are inherently riskier than loans to nonbankrupt individuals, courts applying the presumptive contract rate
approach87 adjust the contract rate for the actual risks associated with
the debtor.88
The Supreme Court rejected the presumptive contract rate approach for the same reasons it rejected the coerced loan approach.89
Additionally, it noted that rebutting the contract rate in order to move
the discount rate downward would be extremely burdensome on debtors seeking to “reduc[e] the likelihood that creditors will be substantially overcompensated.”90 Finally, the Court emphasized the inconsistencies in creditor treatment that may result from this method91:
“because the approach relies heavily on a creditor’s prior dealings with
the debtor, similarly situated creditors may end up with vastly different

82

Id. at 477.
Id.
84
Till, 541 U.S. at 477.
85
Id. at 472.
86
Id.
87
Before Till made its way up to the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit adopted
this approach and remanded the case to the bankruptcy court in order to come up
with the appropriate adjustment to the contract rate of twenty-one percent. Id.
88
Id. at 473.
89
Id. at 477.
90
Till, 541 U.S. at 477.
91
Id. at 478.
83
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cram down rates.”92
3. The Cost of Funds Approach
This method of cramdown rate determination asks: “what it would
cost the creditor to obtain the cash equivalent of the collateral from an
alternative source.”93 The Supreme Court rejected this approach as it
“mistakenly focuses on the creditworthiness of the creditor rather than
the debtor” and increases the debtor’s overall evidentiary burden.94
4. The Formula Approach
The Court finally settled on the method advocated for by the debtors—the formula approach. The formula approach starts with the riskfree rate and adjusts upward based on the risk of non-payment.95 The
Court accepted this method for a number of reasons.96 First, by starting
with a lower rate and adjusting upward, the burden lies “squarely
[with] the creditors, who are likely to have readier access to any information absent from the debtor’s filing.”97 Additionally, the evidentiary
costs are minimal as the debtors’ bankruptcy papers, on record with
the Court, contain a significant amount of information on the debtors’
post-confirmation credit risk.98 Unlike the previous three approaches,
“the formula approach entails a straightforward, familiar, and objective inquiry, and minimizes the need for potentially costly additional
evidentiary proceedings.”99 Finally, Justice Stevens added that the formula approach “best comports with the purposes of the Bankruptcy
Code” as it depends on “the state of financial markets, the circumstances of the bankruptcy estate, and the characteristics of the loan,
not on the creditor’s circumstances or its prior interactions with the
debtor.”100 The plurality further emphasized that the policy behind the
cramdown rate is to “ensure that an objective economic analysis would suggest the debtor’s interest payments will adequately compensate all such creditors
for the time value of their money and the risk of default.”101 In fact, both the

92

Id.
Id. at 473 (quoting In re Till, 301 F.3d 583, 595–96 (7th Cir. 2002)).
94
Id. at 478.
95
Courts generally use the prime rate or treasury yield of comparable duration to
a debtor’s loan. See id. at 478–79.
96
Till, 541 U.S. at 479.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 477 (emphasis added).
93
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plurality and the dissent agreed with this initial premise;102 their only
disagreement was over “which procedure will more often produce accurate estimates of the appropriate interest rate.”103
B. Post-Till Cases Dealing with Cramdown Interest Rate Determination
in the Chapter 11 Context
Since Till was decided, federal courts remain divided with regard
to its applicability in chapter 11. The cases that follow serve to illustrate
the competing approaches of bankruptcy courts around the country.
1. Momentive
In 2006, MPM Silicones (“Momentive”) was taken private through
a leveraged buyout (LBO) by prominent financial sponsor Apollo
Global Management (“Apollo”).104 In order to finance the transaction,
Apollo saddled Momentive with a substantial amount of debt.105 In
2012, Momentive issued first and 1.5 lien notes pursuant to an indenture that provided for 8.875% and 10% interest rates respectively (collectively, the “Senior Lien Notes”).106 As is often the case with LBOs,
the target company failed in part due to its highly leveraged capital
structure.107 In April 2014, Momentive filed for bankruptcy and proposed a plan that would eliminate more than three billion dollars in
debt.108 Momentive’s plan was structured with a “death trap” provision:
it proposed that “all outstanding principal and accrued interest on the
Senior Lien Notes would be paid in cash to the Senior Lien Notes on
the effective date of the Plan.”109 This payment would not, however,
provide for any sort of “make-whole” premium to the Senior Lien Noteholders.110 If the Senior Lien Noteholders refused the terms of the

102

Till, 541 U.S. at 491 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
104
Sara Randazzo, Judge Approves Momentive’s Bankruptcy Exit Plan (Sept. 12, 2014,
3:01 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/judge-approves-momentive-bankruptcyexit-plan-1410548507.
105
Id.
106
U.S. Bank. N.A. v. Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y (In re MPM Silicones, LLC), 531
B.R. 321, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
107
Randazzo, supra note 104.
108
Id.
109
In re MPM Silicones, LLC, 531 B.R. at 326.
110
Id. When a creditor refinances its debt on the open market, the “make-whole”
call premium is designed to compensate the noteholder for the foregone coupon payments it would have received between the call date and maturity date. See LUBBEN,
supra note 52, at 197. Whether or not payment in bankruptcy triggers the make-whole
is an issue of contract interpretation.
103
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consensual plan, Momentive proposed to cram them down with replacement notes “with a present value equal to the Allowed amount of any
such holder’s Claim.”111 Because Momentive failed to meet the voting
requirements of Section 1129(a)(8), the plan had to proceed under
Section 1129(b).112
Interest rate determination was one of the many contested issues
at Momentive’s confirmation hearing.113 Momentive’s Senior Lien
Noteholders objected on the grounds that their deferred payments under the plan failed to meet the requirements of Section
1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).114 More specifically, they alleged that they were entitled to a higher discount rate than the one proposed under the
plan—seven-year treasury plus 1.5%, or approximately 3.6%.115 Like
the lenders in Till, the Senior Lien Noteholders asserted that the coerced loan approach—not the formula approach used by the debtors—was best-suited.116 They argued that Till is only binding in chapter
13 cases and thus was not relevant for Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) considerations. In holding that Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) mandates the
use of the formula approach, Judge Drain began by noting that “there
is no sufficiently contrary basis to distinguish the chapter 13 and chapter 11 plan contexts in light of the similarity of the language of the two
provisions and the underlying present value concept that Till recognized should be applied uniformly throughout the Code.”117 Stating
that the same policy concerns that had led the Supreme Court to accept the formula approach in Till are equally relevant in chapter 11,
the court concluded that the indenture trustee had provided no basis
for its claim that it must be put in “in the same position that it would
have been in had it arranged a ‘new’ loan.”118 The court affirmed Justice Stevens’ rationale in Till that the cramdown rate analysis should
not take into account factors such as “transaction costs and overall
profits.”119 Rather, the purpose of Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) is simply
to ensure that the present value of the deferred cash payments (“C”)
111

In re MPM Silicones, LLC, 531 B.R. at 326 (emphasis added).
Id.
113
In re MPM Silicones, LLC, No. 14-22503-rdd, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3926, at *70
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014).
114
Id. Notably, Judge Drain also determined that the language of the first and 1.5
lien indentures did not entitle the noteholders to the make-whole premium. See generally Lubben, supra note 14.
115
In re MPM Silicones, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3926, at *70–71.
116
Id. at *71.
117
Id. at *72–73.
118
Id. at *75.
119
Id. (quoting Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 477–78 (2004)).
112
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is equal to that of the allowed secured claim.120
Notwithstanding the policy concerns addressed above, the secured lenders in Momentive put forth an additional argument based on
a footnote from Till.121 In footnote 14, Justice Stevens suggested that a
coerced loan approach might work in chapter 11 if a bankruptcy court
can determine that an efficient market exists for such loans. Footnote
14 states:
Because every cram down loan [in chapter 13] is imposed by
a court over the objection of the secured creditor, there is no
free market of willing cram down lenders. Interestingly, the
same is not true in the Chapter 11 context, as numerous lenders advertise financing for Chapter 11 debtors in possession.122
Justice Stevens went on to note that in chapter 11, “it might make
sense to ask what rate an efficient market would produce.”123 The secured lenders in Momentive argued that footnote 14 required a coerced
loan approach in chapter 11 on the ground that the interest rates
charged by the debtor’s bridge lenders and exit facility financiers were
efficient.124 They argued that these rates should be used as proxies for
the plan payments.125 Had the Senior Lien Noteholders accepted the
terms of the original plan, their notes would have been refinanced via
exit facilities that provided for a five percent interest rate for the first
lien exit lenders and a seven percent interest rate for the 1.5 lien lenders.126 Accordingly, they proposed that these rates should be used instead of the 3.6% and 4.1% rates offered under the plan.127
Rejecting the creditors’ argument, the court in Momentive pointed
out a significant flaw in footnote 14. The court emphasized that Justice
Stevens was referring to DIP financing and not exit financing when he
stated that numerous lenders advertise to chapter 11 debtors in possession.128 DIP financing occurs at the beginning of a case, and lenders
obtain special priority status under a plan.129 Exit financing, on the
other hand, occurs at confirmation.130 Because chapter 11 plans often
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130

Id.
In re MPM Silicones, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3926, at *78.
Till, 541 U.S. at 476 n.14.
Id.
See In re MPM Silicones, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3926, at *74–79.
Id. at *74.
Id. at *87.
Id. at *74.
Id. at *81.
Id.
See In re MPM Silicones, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3926, at *81.
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shave substantial amounts of debt from the books of a debtor, creditors
at confirmation are presented “with a less risky, more stable and restructured debtor.”131 This partially eliminates the need to compensate
the creditor with the higher yields that DIP loans provide. With this in
mind, the court emphasized that the market for exit financing in chapter 11 is not a robust one and that the claim that such a market is efficient is dubious at best.132 As a result, the court held that the Senior
Lien Noteholders were not entitled to the rates offered by the exit
lenders. “In this case, for example, the evidence shows that there were
only three available exit lenders to the debtors, who eventually combined on proposed backup takeout facilities while seeking to keep confidential their fees and rate flex provisions.”133 The court ultimately
concluded that footnote 14 should be read narrowly as not to restrict
Till’s applicability to chapter 11 bankruptcies and set the replacement
notes’ interest rates at 4.1% and 4.85%.134 Many other courts across
the country have reached this same conclusion.135
2. Till’s Footnote 14 and the Two-Stepped Approach
Other federal courts have held that a market-based approach may
be used to determinate the rate of interest on a cramdown loan in
chapter 11 if a trial court can determine that an efficient market for
comparable loans exists. In American HomePatient, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit endorsed a two-step approach
for determining the discount rate in a chapter 11 cramdown.136 Relying
primarily on footnote 14, the Sixth Circuit determined that bankruptcy
courts should first look to the market for loans to businesses financially
comparable to the DIP.137 If the lender can demonstrate that the market is efficient, these rates should be used as proxies for plan payments.138 Otherwise, courts should apply the formula approach.139
Apart from American HomePatient, other courts have adopted this two-

131

Id.
See id. at *82.
133
Id. at *83.
134
Id. at *98–99.
135
See id. at *89 (citing In re SW Boston Hotel Venture, LLC, 460 B.R. 38 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 2011); In re Marfin Ready Mix Corp., 220 B.R. 148, 158 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1998); In re Vill. at Camp Bowie I L.P., 454 B.R. 702, 712–13 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2011);
In re Lilo Props., LLC, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 4407, at *3–6 (Bankr. D. Vt. Nov. 4, 2011)).
136
Bank of Montreal v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Am. HomePatient, Inc.), 420 F.3d 559, 568 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 942 (2006).
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
132
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part test as well.140 These courts seem to emphasize one common
theme: as to chapter 11, Till is instructive but not binding.141 As the
court in American HomePatient noted:
[The Sixth Circuit] decline[s] to blindly adopt Till’s endorsement of the formula approach [in Chapter 11] . . . . Rather,
we opt to take our cue from Footnote 14 of the opinion,
which offer[s] the guiding principle that “when picking a
cram down rate in a Chapter 11 case, it might make sense to
ask what rate an efficient market would produce.”142
In spite of the guidance of Till footnote 14 and American HomePatient, the standard for determining whether a market for loans is efficient remains highly ambiguous. In fact, often times, courts adopting
the two-stepped methodology of American HomePatient end up using
the formula approach when the parties fail to present any sort of efficient markets evidence altogether.143 Nonetheless, there are a few reported decisions describing how courts address the question of market
efficiency.
3. Current Market Efficiency Standards for Cramdown Rate
Determination
One example of an opinion explaining how an efficient market
analysis should work is In re 20 Bayard Views, LLC.144 In Bayard Views,
the debtor, a condominium developer, proposed a cramdown plan
over the objection of W Financial Fund LP (WFF), the debtor’s primary secured lender.145 The court decided to follow the two-step approach for rate determination endorsed in American HomePatient.146
140

See In re MPM Sillicones, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3926, at *74 (citing Mercury Capital
Corp. v. Milford Conn. Assocs., L.P., 354 B.R. 1, 11–12 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2006); In re
Cantwell, 336 B.R. 688, 692–93 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2006); In re 20 Bayard Views LLC, 445
B.R. 83 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011)).
141
In re Am. HomePatient, Inc., 420 F.3d at 568.
142
Id. (citing Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 476 n.14 (2004)).
143
See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Tex. Grand. Prairie Hotel Realty, L.L.C. (In re
Tex. Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, L.L.C.), 710 F.3d 324, 333 (5th Cir. 2013) (“While
courts often acknowledge that Till’s Footnote 14 appears to endorse a ‘market rate’
approach under Chapter 11 if an ‘efficient market’ for a loan substantially identical to
the cramdown loan exists, courts almost invariably conclude that such markets are absent.”) (emphasis added); In re Cantwell, 336 B.R. 688, 693 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2006)
(“Here, there has been no evidence produced to establish that an ‘efficient market’
exists to refinance the mortgages on the debtors’ property immediately, as the debtors
are emerging from their Chapter 11 case. We therefore [apply the formula approach].”).
144
445 B.R. 83 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011).
145
Id. at 88.
146
Id. at 109.
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Advocating for a coerced loan rate,147 WFF presented expert testimony
on the existence of a loan market for similar condominium developers.148 The court determined that the analysis should begin with an
inquiry into whether other creditors are willing to lend to companies
similar to the debtor.149 Such a market is deemed “efficient” if these
creditors are willing to lend on terms similar to those of the replacement notes under the plan.150 The court noted that some other courts
examine “whether the debtor can obtain a loan through a combination
of different tranches of financing.”151
At trial, the debtor presented evidence indicating that local lenders had no interest in issuing loans to similar real estate developers.152
The creditors put forth evidence demonstrating that local lenders
would be willing to finance companies similar to the debtor-in-possession via a three-tiered capital structure consisting of first lien debt, mezzanine financing, and equity.153 WFF’s expert witness testified that the
average cost of capital associated with this financing structure
amounted to approximately 11.68%—a figure greater than the discount rate proposed under the plan.154
The court ultimately concluded that “an efficient market does not
exist for a loan of this size secured by collateral of this nature in the
full amount of the value of the [p]roperty,” and “participants in the
loan market were not willing to make a loan of the nature proposed in
the [p]lan.”155 The court ironically relied on WFF’s expert’s own admission that no creditors would be willing to lend on a 100% loan-tovalue basis as the relevant condominium financing market perceives

147

Id. at 106 (“SCS objected to confirmation of the plan, arguing that 21 percent
was the appropriate interest rate because that was the rate it would have received if it
had foreclosed on the truck and reinvested the proceeds in loans of similar duration
and risk.”).
148
Id. at 110.
149
Id. at 109.
150
See In re 20 Bayard Views, 445 B.R. at 109 (citing In re One Times Square Assocs.
Ltd. P’ship, 159 B.R. 695, 706 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993)).
151
Id.
152
Id. at 110. The debtor’s third amended plan of reorganization (“the plan”)
called for WFF to retain the liens on its secured claim of approximately eighteen million dollars as well as to receive new liens on any “leases related to the condominium
storage units.” Id. at 91. Additionally, the debtor proposed to make 4.5% monthly
interest payments on the face value of WFF’s claim in addition to accelerating annual
principal payments over a five-year period. Id. at 88.
153
Id. at 110.
154
Id.
155
Id.
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the risk associated with such leverage to be too high.156 Since the creditor failed to meet its burden in establishing an “efficient market,” the
court next applied the formula approach and determined that the
1.5% risk premium did not adequately reflect the likelihood of a declining equity cushion in the collateral and the possibility of the plan’s
failing.157
Although Bayard Views failed to ultimately apply the coerced loan
approach, it demonstrates, in detail, the factors that courts consider
when determining whether a market for coerced lines is “efficient.”
Other courts and commentators have considered slightly modified approaches.158 Part V.B. will analyze whether this type of analysis truly
comports with the policy behind Till and footnote 14 and will discuss
why this method is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s definition of
“market efficiency.”

156

In re 20 Bayard Views, 445 B.R. at 111.
Id. at 113.
158
See, e.g., In re Winn-Dixie Stores, 356 B.R. 239, 56 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006)
(“Debtor’s search resulted in fourteen proposals among competing lending institutions for a loan that would be junior to the Class 10 Claimants’ liens. The result of
that search was an interest rate of LIBOR plus 150 points. The Court finds that the
process leading to the exit facility was an efficient test of the market.”); In re S. Canaan
Cellular Invs., 427 B.R. 44, 78 n.21 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2010) (“Determination of whether
that market exists requires evidence of loans similar in time of repayment, amount to
be repaid, quality of collateral, and risk of repayment owing to the financial condition
of the borrower.”); Gen. Elec. Credit Equities, Inc. v. Brice Rd. Devs., L.L.C. (In re
Brice Rd. Devs., L.L.C.), 392 B.R. 274, 280–81 (6th Cir. B.A.P. 2008) (noting that in
determining whether a comparable loan market is efficient, courts may consider “the
priority of the lien securing the loan; whether there exists an open, well-developed
market for loans of the kind between the debtor and secured creditor; the type of
collateral involved; the quality, age, and life expectancy of the collateral; the proposed
short- or long- term nature of the loan; and the amount financed”); Louis E. Robichaux IV et al., Till in Chapter 11 Cases and the Looming “Efficient Market” Debate, AM.
BANKR. INST., July 2013, at 22, 24 (proposing that in conducting an efficient markets
analysis, expert witnesses consider the general macroeconomic environment, capital
markets metrics, the debtor’s industry, and “current underwriting parameters in the
loan market that sufficiently matches the cramdown loan,” such as “prevailing interest
rates, lien priority, loan-to-value ratio, and debt service coverage or debt-to-EBITDA
ratio”).
157
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V. WHY THE FORMULA APPROACH SHOULD BE USED IN CHAPTER 11:
TILL AND THE EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS HYPOTHESIS BOTH
NECESSITATE SUCH A RESULT
The holding in American HomePatient subjects itself to criticism for
a number of reasons. First, as articulated in Momentive, any attempt to
justify the use of a coerced rate approach in chapter 11 is inconsistent
with the overriding policy concerns of the Code outlined in Till. Second, the type of efficient market analysis contemplated by courts that
declined to follow Till is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s notion
of market efficiency as it erroneously equates the concept of a robust
market with an efficient market.159 The parts of this Comment that
follow discuss why all of these concerns provide support for the use of
Till’s formula approach in chapter 11.
A. Till’s Applicability in Chapter 11: Cost-Savings and Public Policy
Justifications
Economic considerations, stare decisis, and public policy all
strongly favor Till’s application to all chapters of the Code. Such considerations should encourage courts to apply a non-market-based approach in chapter 11.
One important consideration for interpreting the Bankruptcy
Code is how a particular reading of the language of the statute will
impact the economics of the estate and the courts. Unanticipated postpetition fees and expenses can be detrimental to the debtor’s business.
The evidentiary costs of a hearing on the efficiency of the market for
comparable loans create another obstacle for a DIP attempting to get
a plan confirmed. More financial resources are drained, and the likelihood of the debtor’s emergence from bankruptcy decreases. The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of minimizing these costs in
rejecting the coerced loan and cost of funds approach. “[T]he cost of
funds approach imposes a significant evidentiary burden, as a debtor seeking
to rebut a creditor’s asserted cost of borrowing must introduce expert testimony
about the creditor’s financial condition.”160 As stated by the Momentive
court, these policy concerns are equally relevant in chapter 11. Proffering expert testimony is a costly and time-consuming process that
may ultimately serve as a detriment to successful business reorganization. Indeed one commentator has emphasized how problematic this
159

See, e.g., Simkovic & Kaminetzky, supra note 20, at 157 (“The Supreme Court has
long embraced the belief, widely shared by many Anglo-American economists, that
well-regulated financial markets effectively process available information and thereby
fairly and appropriately value securities.”).
160
Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 478 (2004) (emphasis added).
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burden can be, noting that “[a]s the credit crisis worsens and DIP lending becomes scarce, it will become increasingly problematic to require
chapter 11 debtors to adduce evidence of a market rate, let alone an
efficient market rate during a recession.”161 The incremental evidentiary costs associated with the formula approach, however, are minimal
as the bankruptcy court already has the necessary information at hand
for determining the applicable risk premium.162 Bankruptcy courts
routinely examine the factors used to arrive at such a premium when
determining the feasibility of a plan under Section 1129(a)(11).163
Some of these factors may include “[the] debtor’s industry, projections, leverage, revised capital structure, and obligations under the
plan.”164 Because these factors are always taken into consideration in
any Section 1129(a)(11) analysis, the formula approach will save the
court both time and resources. The formula approach therefore reduces the overall burdens associated with chapter 11, both from debtor
and judicial perspectives, and increases the likelihood of the debtor’s
successful emergence from bankruptcy.
The doctrine of stare decisis is also particularly relevant in corporate restructuring jurisprudence. Consistent legal standards play an
important role in determining the likelihood that a distressed business
will emerge from bankruptcy.165 As the “interests of predictability in
commercial bankruptcy cases are of such great importance,”166 courts
should adopt a cramdown rate approach that yields consistent and predictable results. The range of potential outcomes from the coerced
loan approach is vast and imposes a significant level of uncertainty on
161

Pill, supra note 4, at 298–99.
Till, 541 U.S. at 479 (stating that the court must start with the appropriate riskfee rate and “adjust the [rate] accordingly” based on factors such as “the circumstances
of the estate, the nature of the security, and the duration and feasibility of the reorganization plan”).
163
See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (2012) (“Confirmation of the plan is not likely to
be followed by the liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization, of the
debtor or any successor to the debtor under the plan, unless such liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the plan.”). Commonly known as the “feasibility test,” a
debtor satisfies this test through expert testimony on the company’s operations, financial statements and projections, general economic conditions and systemic risk, and
proffers demonstrating the risk associated with plan confirmation.
164
See generally AM. BANKR. INST. COMM’N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11,
FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 234–37 (2012), http://commission.abi.org/
full-report.
165
See In re GMC, 407 B.R. 463, 504 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[S]tare decisis is particularly important in commercial bankruptcy cases because of the expense and
trauma of any commercial bankruptcy, and the need to deal with foreseeable events,
by pre-bankruptcy planning, to the extent they can be addressed.”).
166
Id.
162
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the debtor. The magnitude of this variation can amount to millions of
extra dollars in unanticipated interest payments.167 The risk premium
associated with the formula approach, however, tends to be lower and
more stable since a bankruptcy judge cannot confirm a plan unless it
“is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for further
financial reorganization” unless disclosed.168 Such a conclusion inherently necessitates a relatively low and predictable risk-premium under
the formula approach. By using the formula approach, courts can
therefore eliminate some of the uncertainty associated with the wide
range of possible outcomes under the coerced loan approach.
Public policy considerations also play a significant role when analyzing any statute. The policy argument against applying the formula
approach appears to be predicated upon two themes: (1) the desire to
protect a creditor’s pre-petition expectations; and (2) the inherent differences between a consumer debtor and a business debtor.169 The former stems from the concern that the cramdown rate might be significantly smaller than the original contract rate and will therefore
undermine the lender’s initial expectations. The probability of a bankruptcy filing, however, is generally contemplated when executing a
credit agreement. A “default” under the agreement is often defined
to include a bankruptcy filing, and the debt immediately accelerates.
When this occurs, there is often a significant time delay between the
filing and the distributions under the plan. Moreover, in the case of a
sale of the debtor’s assets, such sale may yield insufficient proceeds to
cover the lender’s claim, and the creditor is forced to take a substantial
loss. In sum, a bankruptcy petition inherently triggers numerous uncertainties, and the Code expressly contemplates multiple scenarios
where a creditor’s expectations may be undermined. With respect to
the second concern, while it is true that the policies underlying a consumer bankruptcy and business reorganization differ in many respects,
Congress explicitly codified numerous provisions that reflect these
concerns. That Congress chose to use virtually identical language in
the relevant chapter 11 and chapter 13 provisions suggests that it did
not intend for the cramdown rate analysis to differ in the two contexts.
“[T]here is no sufficiently contrary basis to distinguish the chapter 13
and chapter 11 plan contexts in light of the similarity of the language of
the two provisions and the underlying present value concept that Till recognized
167

See generally GMAC v. Valenti (In re Valenti), 105 F.3d 55, 64 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting the wide range of risk-premiums applied by courts in the consumer cramdown
settings).
168
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11).
169
See, e.g., Wong, supra note 4, at 1954–56.
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should be applied uniformly throughout the Code.”170 Major American financial institutions may contain both consumer and corporate financing
arms, and it makes little sense to suggest that businesses loans and corporate loans should be treated differently in this context.
The strength of the policy justifications behind applying the formula approach and the flaws of the arguments against its applicability
in chapter 11 combine to favor a broad reading of Till that incorporates its holding to chapter 11. These policy considerations should deter courts confronted with chapter 11 cramdown plans from reading
Till footnote 14 in “a way contrary to Till and Valenti’s first principles.”171 The principles articulated in these cases are straightforward
and equally applicable in chapter 13 and chapter 11: the proper interest rate should set the present value of a note’s future cash flows equal
to the amount of the allowed secured claim when discounted by the
correct yield. Although Till is often discounted because it is a plurality
opinion, even the dissenting four Justices concurred with this fundamental principle.172 As discussed in Part III, factors such as the firm’s
risk of nonpayment, the duration of the note, inflation, and the value
of the collateral will yield a rate that will balance the equation in Figure
6. For the aforementioned reasons, a non-market-based approach is a
more efficient method of achieving this objective from a policy perspective.
The above notwithstanding, it should be noted that the American
Bankruptcy Institute (ABI) Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 (the “Commission”) recently suggested that Congress should reject Till’s applicability to chapter 11 cases.173 In fact, the Commission
went a step further than the Sixth Circuit in American HomePatient in
arguing that the formula approach is inappropriate in chapter 11
“even if an efficient market does not exist.”174 Nonetheless, the Com-

170

In re MPM Silicones, LLC, No. 14-22503-rdd, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3926, at *72–
73 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014) (emphasis added).
171
Id. at *84.
172
Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 508 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Eight
justices are in agreement that the rate of interest set forth in the debtor’s approved
plan must include a premium for risk. Of those eight, four are of the view that beginning with the contract rate would most accurately reflect the actual risk, and four are
of the view that beginning with the prime lending rate would do so.”); see also In re
Texas Grand Prairie Hotel, 710 F.3d 324, 330 (5th Cir. 2013) (“In other words, the
deferred payments, discounted to present value by applying the appropriate interest
rate . . . must equal the allowed amount of the secured creditor’s claim.”).
173
AM. BANK. INS. COMM’N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, supra note 164, at
234–37.
174
Id. at 237.
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mission did not address in detail why the overarching policy goals described in Till should apply only in chapter 13.175 Furthermore, the
Commission asserted that the formula approach fails to capture the
economic realities of the restructured debtor.176 It is unclear, however,
why the Commission takes this position when the formula approach,
by its very definition, attempts to capture the underlying variables associated with the firm’s credit risk. Additionally, the Commission
states that if a market rate cannot be determined, courts should consider a “risk-adjusted rate that reflects the actual risk posed in the case
of the reorganized debtor considering factors such as the debtor’s industry, projections, leverage, revised capital structure, and obligations
under the plan.”177 These are some of the factors that should be inherent in any interest rate calculation.178
Further, the Commission’s argument that the formula rate likely
undercompensates the creditor for the risk associated with the postconfirmation debtor may suggest that the debtor should not have even
passed the feasibility test in the first place. Since Section 1129(a)(11)
requires courts to determine that confirmation of the plan is not “likely
to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to the debtor under the
plan,” such a determination may be tantamount to a finding that the
securities issued under the plan do not carry enough risk to warrant a
substantial premium over the treasury or prime rate.179 Additionally,
the Commission acknowledges that it did not try to decipher the holding in Till.180 Nonetheless, because the Till case is the closest indicator
of where the Supreme Court may stand on this issue, it makes sense to
scrutinize footnote 14, at least before Congress formally considers the
Commission’s proposals.

175

Id.
Id.
177
Id.
178
See, e.g., In re Texas Grand Prairie Hotel, 710 F.3d 324, 334 (5th Cir. 2013) (noting that the risk premium should factor in “the quality of the debtor’s management,
the commitment of the debtor’s owners, the health and future prospects of the
debtor’s business, the quality of the lenders collateral, and the feasibility and duration
of the plan”).
179
See In re MPM Silicones, No. 14-22503-rdd, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3926, at *81
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014) (“The fact that the debtor is more stable is bound up
in the court’s necessary feasibility determination under Section 1129(a)(11).”). See
also Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 480–81 (“If the court determines that the
likelihood of default is so high as to necessitate an ‘eye-popping’ interest rate . . . the
[chapter 13] plan probably should not be confirmed.”) (citations omitted).
180
AM. BANKR. INST. COMM’N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, supra note 164,
at 234–37.
176
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B. Financial Considerations: Reconciling the Different Standards for
Determining Market Efficiency and the Potential Pitfalls of the
Footnote 14 Analysis
In spite of the compelling public policy reasons for using the formula approach discussed above, many courts have rejected this line of
reasoning. Courts that have done so often base their decisions upon
Till footnote 14. As the wording of this footnote is highly convoluted
and contains numerous technical ambiguities, an examination of what
the Supreme Court might have intended is crucial before taking footnote 14’s directive.
At first glance, footnote 14 appears to suggest that DIP loans
might serve as accurate proxies for cramdown rates. For the reasons
stated above, however, most bankruptcy practitioners acknowledge
that this was a technical error on Justice Stevens’ part. As a result,
courts that disapprove of the per se use of the formula approach in
chapter 11 have modified the analysis to find that footnote 14 allows
parties to “ask what [non-DIP loan] rate an efficient market would produce”181 before determining whether the formula approach or coerced
loan approach should be used in a chapter 11 case. But what exactly
does Justice Stevens mean by “efficient market?” As discussed supra,
courts have interpreted footnote 14 in a way that allows creditors to
receive a coerced loan rate if they can show that a robust market exists
for loans to entities similar to the debtor (what these courts call an
“efficient market”).182 Indeed, this was the test that American HomePatient and 20 Bayard Views endorsed.183 When carefully scrutinizing this
footnote, however, reasonable minds can differ as to whether an abundance of lenders is the sole criterion for what the Supreme Court
deems an “efficient market.”184 After all, if Justice Stevens had truly
believed that the existence of an abundance of lenders to similar debtors was the only factor in ascertaining the reliability of market rates,
why did he not accept the creditor’s argument in Till? The secured
lender in that case was able to demonstrate the existence of a robust
181

Till, 541 U.S. at 476 n.14.
See supra Part IV.B.3.
183
Id.
184
See, e.g., A Deep Dive into Till v. SCS Credit Corp—Part VII: How to Understand
Footnote 14, THE NECESSARY AND PROPER BLOG, (Jan. 3, 2014, 4:30 PM), http://thenecessaryandproperblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/a-deep-dive-into-till-v-scs-creditcorp_2837.html (arguing that courts have misinterpreted the meaning of footnote 14
and have overemphasized its precedential value in chapter 11); Pill, supra note 4, at
291–92 (“In Till, the Court referenced in dicta a ‘free market of willing lenders’ but
did not establish whether the availability of DIP lending singularly would establish the
presence of a market.”).
182
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primary market for subprime automobile lending (as noted by Judge
Drain in Momentive). Nonetheless, Justice Stevens still refused to allow
the creditors to discount the plan payments at this rate and implied
that such a characteristic of a market was not indicative of its efficiency.
Moreover, he made it clear that the purpose of the cramdown rate is
solely to ensure that the present value of the creditor’s future cash
flows under the plan equaled the amount of its allowed secured claim.
Allowing a secured lender to receive the equivalent of what it could
receive if it were to foreclose on the collateral and invest the proceeds
in such “efficient” debt instruments seems to contradict this policy concern. As stated above, Justice Stevens offered no justification for why
this concern should not apply in chapter 11, and the dissent appeared
to concur with this principle. Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
why would the Court redefine the term “efficient market” without explaining the new definition in this context when it has a well-established legal definition that has laid the foundation for numerous Supreme Court opinions and serves as the basis for the federal securities
laws? In sum, many of these suggested interpretations of footnote 14
contain significant flaws, and it is therefore necessary to look at the
footnote from different angles.185
As footnote 14 is both ambiguous and prone to criticism from a
bankruptcy practitioner’s perspective, prior Supreme Court cases may
be consulted to get a better idea of the true meaning of the term “efficient markets.”186 The seminal case on this issue, Basic Inc. v. Levinson,
provides some useful guidance.187 A major question before the Supreme Court in Basic Inc. was whether a corporation’s false statements
denying that it was in merger negotiations, which induced a shareholder to sell artificially depressed shares of the defendant’s stock, can
be deemed “material” in a securities fraud claim.188 In order to plead

185

See Wong, supra note 4, at 1953–54 (“The plurality did suggest that an efficient
market analysis should apply to Chapter 11 cramdowns, but it failed to provide a workable definition of efficient market.”). But see A Deep Dive into Till v. SCS Credit Corp—
Part VII: How to Understand Footnote 14, supra note 184 (arguing that the footnote refers
to a colloquy in oral argument and should not be relied on in chapter 11).
186
For an alternative perspective arguing that the “efficient market comment” in
footnote 14 simply refers to usury laws in consumer lending, see Thompson &
McDonough, supra note 4, at 913–14 (asserting that the footnote referenced a specific
colloquy from oral argument and should not be interpreted as having any significant
precedential value in the chapter 11 context).
187
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); see also Wong, supra note 4, at 1948
(“Although Till did not define the term ‘efficient market,’ the term has appeared quite
frequently in other areas of law, especially securities litigation.”).
188
Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 227–35.

GREEN (DO NOT DELETE)

1182

5/18/2016 1:34 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1151

a securities fraud claim, a plaintiff must show the element of reliance.189
More specifically, the court addressed the question of whether a plaintiff in a Rule 10b-5 action is entitled to a presumption of reliance on
the theory that, in a non-face-to-face transaction, he relied on the market price of the security in ascertaining its actual value.190 Noting that
“[r]ecent empirical studies have tended to confirm Congress’ premise
that the market price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all
publicly available information, and, hence, any material misrepresentations,”191 the Court wrote that spreading false information about a corporation undermines an investor’s expectation that a security’s price
should paint an accurate picture of the company—an actionable claim
under Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 that the Court deemed the
“fraud on the market theory.”192 And those “empirical studies” to which
Basic Inc. referred, the foundation of the fraud on the market theory,
form the basis of what economists call the “Efficient Capital Markets
Hypothesis” (ECMH).193 Indeed, the ECMH is a major driving force
behind today’s securities laws, and its application in legal matters is
widespread. “Of all recent developments in financial economics, the
efficient capital market hypothesis (‘ECMH’) has achieved the widest
acceptance by the legal culture.”194
In spite of the fact that lawyers and judges alike have embraced
the ECMH, practitioners often fail to correctly apply its principles in
the legal setting. “[T]he legal culture’s remarkably rapid and broad
acceptance of [the ECMH] is not matched by an equivalent degree of
understanding.”195 Such a strong statement invites three important
questions. First, how does the ECMH define “efficient markets?” Second, does it make sense that Justice Stevens and the plurality intended
for this definition to apply in the cramdown rate context? And finally,
are debt markets efficient in the context of distressed debt and loans
to companies emerging from chapter 11?

189

5 Alan R. Bromberg & Lewis D. Lowenfels, Bromberg & Lowenfels on Securities
Fraud and Commodities Fraud § 7.431 (2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter Bromberg & Lowenfels Treatise].
190
See Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 228.
191
Id. at 246 (emphasis added).
192
Id. at 247.
193
Id. at 253 n.4 (White, J., dissenting).
194
See id. (quoting Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 549–50 (1984)).
195
Id.
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1. The Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis and its Three
Forms
In the broadest terms, the “ECMH [holds] that the prices of securities traded in public capital markets fully reflect all information concerning those securities.”196 This is precisely the foundation of the Supreme Court’s holding in Basic Inc.197
The ECMH posits three distinct types of efficient markets: the
weak form, the semi-strong form, and the strong form.198 Weak form
efficiency implies that “current security prices fully reflect all information consisting of past security prices.”199 In other words, security
price changes are independent of past price changes—a classic “random walk.”200 Any price change can result only from the production of
new information.201 Semi-strong form efficiency implies that security
prices reflect all past and present publicly available information about
the underlying company.202 The strong form of the ECMH holds that
all information, both public and non-public, is reflected in a security’s
current price.203 Under this model, it is impossible for an investor to
generate returns in excess of the market index over the long-term as
market prices instantaneously incorporate all material public and nonpublic information.204 It is important to note that the ECMH does not
suggest that positive long-run returns are impossible in an efficient
market. Rather, in an efficient market, “it is not possible to find expected returns greater (or less) than the risk-adjusted opportunity cost
of capital.”205
Now that a definition of market efficiency has been established, it
makes sense to pause for a moment to consider how this definition is
relevant to the footnote 14 analysis. After all, if courts in the chapter
11 context have applied a different definition of efficiency, one may

196

Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546, 559 (1994).
197
See Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 245–46 (“In drafting that [Securities Exchange Act],
Congress expressly relied on the premise that securities markets are affected by information, and enacted legislation to facilitate an investor’s reliance on the integrity of
those markets.”).
198
Cunningham, supra note 196.
199
Id. at 560.
200
See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 55, at 355.
201
Cunningham, supra note 196, at 560.
202
Id.
203
Id.
204
Id.
205
See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 55, at 328.
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potentially question the ECMH’s relevance.206 When viewed through
the lens of the ECMH, however, the purpose of the market-based approach suggested in Till footnote 14 becomes more evident. In the
main text of the opinion, the plurality held that the purpose of the
cramdown rate was to provide an accurate gauge of the debtor’s credit
risk and to ensure that the equation in Figure 6 balances. While it did
suggest that the coerced loan approach may make sense in chapter 11,
it never expressly stated that this policy concern is no longer the driving factor in a chapter 11 cramdown rate analysis.
The ECMH, however, can help to reconcile these two apparently
contradictory concerns: comparable market rates may be helpful to the
extent that they fully reflect all of the underlying information about
the borrower. A market rate that is an accurate reflection of the
debtor’s risk of default will ensure that the Figure 6 equation balances;207 if the market is not efficient, the obtained rate may fail to do
so, as the coupon “C” may differ significantly from the yield “r.” Put
another way, a coupon payment that is a function of “the time value of
[the secured lender’s] money and the risk of default” 208 should equal
what that debt instrument would yield in an efficient secondary market. This ensures that the secured lender’s claim is paid out at 100
cents on the dollar. As stated above, the expected rate of return on
the investment should equal the risk-adjusted opportunity cost of capital and any difference may be indicative of an inefficient market.209
The issue of whether market rates fully reflect the information
underlying a chapter 11 debtor can be addressed by looking at realworld studies on the validity of the ECMH and the fraud on the market
cases involving debt and equity securities. As suggested in Basic Inc.,
empirical testing has confirmed that semi-strong form efficiency may
exist in some equity markets.210 Moreover, it is possible that the strong
206

Pill, supra note 4, at 290 (“While the term ‘efficient market’ has a commonly
used definition in securities litigation, the question remains whether bankruptcy
courts will transpose the definition into the bankruptcy arena.”).
207
LUBBEN, supra note 52, at 48 (noting that the proper discount rate should take
into account the default risk, inflation risk, and duration risk). See also Wong, supra
note 4, at 1947 (“[A]n efficient market rate of interest may accurately capture the present value of the secured claim, thus fulfilling the fair-and-equitable requirement of
the cramdown provisions.”).
208
Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 477 (2004).
209
See Michael Vitti, Is Momentive a Bigger Deal than Typically Reported, or is it Much
Ado About Nothing?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2016, at 40, 109 (“The expected economic
profit for a loan issued in an efficient market is (near) zero because the interest will
just cover the opportunity cost of capital.”).
210
See generally, e.g., J. M. Patell & M. A. Wolfson, The Intraday Speed of Adjustment of
Stock Prices to Earnings and Dividend Announcements, 13 J. FIN. ECON., no. 2, 1984, at 223,
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form of the ECMH may also have some real-world applicability. “[Research on] strong-form efficiency has proved to be sufficiently convincing that many professionally managed funds have given up the pursuit
of superior performance. They simply ‘buy the index’ . . . .”211 The
ECMH, however, remains prone to criticism from both the legal and
financial community. Professor James Cox has noted that, “[t]hough
[the ECMH] is a cornerstone on which much of securities law has been
built, the efficient market hypothesis continues to be surrounded by
controversy as scholars from the fields of economics and finance seriously question whether the model fully captures investor behavior . . .
or, for that matter, whether the model can ever be validated or discredited.”212 Still, the legal community and the courts accept the notion
that, at the bare minimum, semi-strong form efficiency exists in today’s
equity markets, a notion validated by numerous empirical studies.213
Despite courts’ acceptance of the ECMH in cases involving stock pricing, the case law and financial literature is less clear with regard to debt
instruments—precisely the type of securities courts approve in a typical
chapter 11 cramdown.214

223–52. Semi-strong efficiency is generally tested by examining a security price’s reaction time to the disclosure of material information. Id.
211
BREALEY ET AL., supra note 55, at 362; but see Cunningham, supra note 196, at 561
(“The insider trading scandals of the 1980s are among the many proofs that the strong
from of the ECMH is invalid.”).
212
JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 96–97 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 7th ed. 2013) (citing R.A. HAUGEN, THE NEW FINANCE: THE CASE AGAINST EFFICIENT
MARKETS (1995)); see also James Tobin, On the Efficiency of the Financial System, LLOYDS
BANK REV., July 1984, at 1, https://economicsociologydotorg.
files.wordpress.com/2014/12/tobin-on-the-efficiency-of-the-financial-system.pdf.
213
BREALEY ET AL., supra note 55, at 362.
214
See, e.g., Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & “ERISA”
Litig.), 529 F. Supp. 2d 644, 748 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (“[N]o standard at all appears to
have been established for measuring market efficiency for debt securities. Adding to
that difficulty, thus far there is little scholarly literature about, and only a few courts
have addressed, market efficiency for bonds.”); see also Chris Downing et al., The Relative Informational Efficiency of Stocks and Bonds: An Intraday Analysis, J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, Oct. 2009, at 1081, 1081–82 (noting that because the “market
for corporate bonds has long been relatively opaque[,] . . . previous studies of the
relation between stock and bond returns have drawn conflicting conclusions from
dealer quotes of uncertain quality, or narrow datasets that leave the generality of the
results open to question”).
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2. Efficiency of the Markets Relevant to Chapter 11
Proceedings: Secondary Trading Markets, Small Cap
Firms, Distressed Firms, and Primary Markets
As described above, “the [ECMH] applies to all types of investment assets.”215 Nonetheless, the hypothesis has been tested primarily
on equity markets.216 “After all, stocks have the most liquid and transparent trading markets, so if the theory applies anywhere, it should
apply to stocks.”217 Efforts to improve the transparency of the corporate
bond and secured loan markets began in the early 2000s, and, as a result, the topic of credit market efficiency has not been studied as extensively.218
Even without numerous conclusive studies to guide their analysis,
courts can look at the assumptions behind the ECMH in determining
whether a market for a security is efficient. As Professor Lubben noted
above, liquidity and transparent trading markets are two key assumptions behind the ECMH.219 Other assumptions include “a large number of participants such that the actions of any individual participant
cannot materially affect the market . . . fully informed [market participants], [participants] have equal access to the market, and act rationally; the commodity is homogeneous; and there are no transaction
costs.”220 These assumptions appear to be reasonable with respect to
common stocks. The common shares of many public corporations
trade on highly centralized exchanges with strict transparency standards.221 Numerous individuals place trades on these exchanges every

215

LUBBEN, supra note 52, at 93.
Id.
217
Id.
218
See, e.g., Chris Downing et al., supra note 214, at 1082 (“In recent years, the [National Association of Securities Dealers] has made sweeping reforms of the reporting
requirements for over-the-counter corporate bond transactions in an effort to improve
the transparency of the market, culminating in the public dissemination of information on most corporate bond transactions.”); Cheng Ying, The Informational Efficiency of the Corporate Bond Market (July 2006) (Masters of Science in Finance Thesis) (“Beginning on July 1, 2002, the National Association of Securities Dealers . . .
requires all bond dealers to report their transactions through its Trade Reporting and
Compliance Engine [TRACE] System.”).
219
See Cunningham, supra note 187.
220
See generally id.; see also Wong, supra note 4, at 1948 (citing Jonathan R. Macey et
al., Lessons from Financial Economics: Materiality, Reliance, and Extending the Reach of Basic
v. Levinson, 77 VA. L. REV. 1017, 1022 (1991)).
221
See generally Listed Company Manuel, NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE (Apr. 22, 2016,
10:25 PM), http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCM/Sections/.
216
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day, and companies are subject to countless information-disclosure requirements under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.222 Furthermore, because these companies have such large market capitalizations,
it may be difficult for an individual to materially affect the market by
himself.223 District courts have relied upon these assumptions in determining whether the market for a company’s common stock is efficient.224 In Cammer v. Bloom, the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey looked at five factors when making this inquiry:
(1) trade volume and liquidity; (2) the existence of analyst coverage;
(3) the presence of market makers and arbitrageurs; (4) eligibility to
participate in the SEC’s integrated disclosure procedures; and (5) the
stock’s responsiveness to new corporate information.225 Not surprisingly, these “Cammer factors” are nothing more than the assumptions
behind the ECMH.
While the Cammer factors are still relevant in determining whether
a market for a company’s debt is efficient, a few important distinctions
in the analysis are worth nothing. First, courts have stated that the
analysis must be conducted “with a view to [bonds’] distinctive nature
and to the kinds of news that would move their market price in contrast
to the kind of information that might affect the more volatile stock
market.”226 Because the primary determinants of a debt instrument’s
price are the nominal value of the periodic payment “C” and the probability of a default, the underlying information pertaining to the company’s financial health (i.e. risk of default) is most relevant in this context.227 This makes sense since corporate bondholders typically do not
stand to benefit from the issuer’s potential upside to the same extent
222

See generally COX ET AL., supra note 212, at 9–10 (providing an overview of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
223
For example, as of November 5, 2014, Apple Inc.’s ten largest institutional
shareholders own a combined twenty-three percent of the company. Each one of these
institutions holds Apple stock in its ETFs and Mutual funds on behalf of thousands of
investors worldwide.
See Apple Inc., YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/q/mh?s=AAPL+Major+Holders (last visited Nov. 5, 2014, 4:30 PM).
224
See, e.g., Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989).
225
Id. at 1286–87. Factor 5, responsiveness to new information, tends to be the
method by which economists have empirically validated the semi-strong form of the
ECMH. It is also considered the most important factor in the analysis. See id. at 1287
(“This, after all, is the essence of an efficient market and the foundation for the fraud
on the market theory.”).
226
Newby v. Enron Corp., 529 F. Supp. 2d 644, 749 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
227
See id. at 755–56. See also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance,
Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market-Theory, 42 STANFORD L. REV. 1059,
1085 (1990) (“[I]t seems clear that not all corporate information will affect all securities of a given issuer in the same way. Debt securities will be more insulated from the
shocks associated with bad news than will equity securities.”).
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as shareholders. Even in a perfectly efficient market, information that
may increase the price of the firm’s common stock might have no effect on the firm’s bond price.228 When the likelihood of default increases and the firm approaches insolvency, however, any information
pertaining to the firm’s value and credit risk can be expected to have
a significant impact on the bond’s price under the ECMH.229 Moreover, two variables as opposed to one are relevant: the bond’s price and
yield. As discussed in Part II, a bond’s price and yield are inversely
related, and the appropriate question in determining the bond’s efficiency is whether or not these two variables accurately capture the information relevant to the default risk. As a result, some courts have
noted that the Cammer factors are not as helpful in the context of debt
securities.230 Nonetheless, they can provide a court with a threshold
indication of a debt instrument’s informational efficiency.231 Accordingly, the relevant inquiry is the degree to which the presence of these
factors indicates that the bond/note’s price and yield are a function of
all material information indicative of the company’s default risk (the
“Modified Cammer factors”).
The idea that debt markets exhibit the same degree of efficiency
as equity markets has been met with some skepticism from lawyers and
economists alike.232 This makes sense when analyzing the Cammer fac-

228

In re HealthSouth Corp. Secs. Litig., 261 F.R.D. 616, 635–36 (N.D. Ala. 2009)
(“Information that may be material to a stock price, such as the announcement of a
dividend, may not be material for a bond investor whose fixed return would not be
affected. In contrast, the price of bonds may be affected by general, non-company
specific information, such as changes in risk-free interest rates, that would not affect
stock prices.”).
229
See Downing et al., supra note 214 (“Because the BBB- and junk-rated bonds are
closer to default, the expected cash flows and hence prices of these bonds react to
news about the firm’s cash flows, albeit at a lag relative to their associated equity owing
to the relative inefficiency of the bond market.”).
230
Id. at 755.
231
Id. at 752. See also Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier, Inc., 546 F.3d 196, 210 (2d Cir. 2008) (“We conclude, however, that the district court properly used the Cammer factors as an ‘analytical tool’ [in the debt context].”) (quoting Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 325 (5th Cir. 2005)); In re
Petrobras Sec. Litig., 14-cv-9662 (JSR), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12286, at *36 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 2, 2016) (“Although the Cammer factors were not designed for debt securities . . .
[t]he Court agrees that the modified Cammer factors provide a useful rubric to evaluate
debt markets.”); In re NII Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., 1:14-CV-227(LMB/JFA), 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 156034, at *18 (E.D. Va. Nov. 17, 2015) (“Although the showings to establish market efficiency for bond markets differs from the showing for stock exchanges,
courts tend to employ the Cammer factors as an analytical tool when determining
whether bonds traded in an efficient market.”).
232
See, e.g., Stephen J. Lubben, When Debt Markets Don’t Really Act as Markets, N.Y.
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tors. Major companies with stock trading on large U.S. exchanges register their shares in accordance with the Securities Act of 1933, making
such shares freely tradable and providing easy liquidity for investors.233
Corporate debt, however, is often sold privately through various exemptions from registration under the Securities Act of 1933.234 Some
of these securities may be restricted and, unlike their equity counterparts, may not be freely tradable and some may not fall under the purview of the Securities Act at all.235 Furthermore, many debt instruments
trade over-the-counter (OTC).236 In OTC markets, an investor must
often “search for a buyer, incurring opportunity or other costs until
one is found.”237 The process of obtaining a “bid and ask”238 is often a
strategic bargaining process.239 The end result is less liquidity and information and bargaining asymmetries.240 “Fundamentally, corporate
bond funds often hold large positions in bonds that don’t trade in
TIMES (Oct. 1, 2014, 3:57 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/01/whendebt-markets-don’t-really-act-as-markets/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0; Downing et
al., supra note 214, at 1083 (noting that contrary to results of prior empirical studies,
the authors dataset “indicate[s] that the bond market is in general less informationally
efficient than the equity market”). But see Edith S. Hotchkiss & Tavy Ronen, The Informational Efficiency of the Corporate Bond Market: An Intraday Analysis, 15 REV. FIN. STUD.
1325, 1327 (2002) (concluding that firm-specific information is “incorporated as
quickly into bond prices as into prices of the underlying stock”).
233
See generally 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2012) (prohibiting the sale of securities for
which no registration statement is in effect).
234
See LUBBEN, supra note 52, at 196.
235
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3) (exempting certain notes from Section 5 registration requirements); § 77c(a)(9) (exempting debt instruments issued under certain
exchange offers and out of court plans of restructuring); § 77c(a)(10) (exempting
certificates issued by a DIP in a chapter 11 case). See also 17 CFR 230.144A (2016)
(commonly known as a “Rule 144A Offering;” this “safe-harbor” enables issuers to sell
corporate debt to “Qualified Institutional Buyers” while avoiding the registration requirements of Section 5); STANDARD & POOR’S, A GUIDE TO THE LOAN MARKET 9 (2011),
https://www.lcdcomps.com/d/pdf/LoanMarketguide.pdf (“Because loans are not securities, this will be a confidential offering made only to qualified banks and accredited
investors.”).
236
See Newby v. Enron Corp., 529 F. Supp. 2d 644, 748 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (“Bonds
are usually traded in the over-the-counter market.”).
237
Darrell Duffie et al., Over-The-Counter Markets, 73 ECONOMETRICA 1815, 1815
(2005).
238
In finance, the “bid-ask spread” is defined as the difference between the price
at which the buyer is willing to buy and at which the seller is willing to sell. Low bidask spreads are common on centralized exchanges because there are many market
participants. A low bid-ask may be indicative of an efficient market as wider spreads
may indicated information asymmetries, transaction costs, or unequal bargaining positions. See LUBBEN, supra note 52, at 196.
239
Duffie et al., supra note 237.
240
See, e.g., Lubben, supra note 232; see also Downing et al., supra note 214, at 1083
(“[T]he transaction costs for corporate bonds remain relatively high compared to equities.”).
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large amounts each day.”241 This relatively low trade volume (when
compared to the stock market) appears to suggest that debt markets in
general are less liquid than their equity counterparts. While courts
have noted that over-the-counter trading is not dispositive, the trading
still may lend itself towards a finding of inefficiency.242
In response to these arguments, proponents of the efficient market theory’s applicability to credit markets have noted that the Cammer
factors such as liquidity, trade volume, and the presence of market
makers must be analyzed differently with respect to bonds.243 For example, when a firm’s financial health is strong and improving by the
day, a high trade volume should not be expected as the probability of
repayment is strong even before the positive news.244 In fact, a spike in
trade volume in response to this immaterial information may be indicative of inefficiency.245 Distressed debt, on the other hand, may be more
sensitive to the type of information that may influence equity price.246
Moreover, as stated above, some commentators have noted that
over-the-counter trading on its own should not be enough to establish
the inefficiency of a debt instrument.247 One court has also held that
“whether market makers in the over-the-counter-market, specifically
the market for [the particular security], provided a sufficiently fluid
and informed trading environment so that when material information
about [the issuer] was disseminated, investors had available to them an
opportunity to trade at informed, and therefore appropriate, bid and
asked prices.”248 Moreover, some have argued that despite the fact that
these instruments trade over-the-counter with a low frequency, the major financial institutions that hold significant bond positions are sophisticated parties and are better able to distill all material publically
available information and incorporate this information into the price
and yield. “[Plaintiff’s expert] argued that . . . [bond markets are]

241

Lubben, supra note 232.
Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1281 (D.N.J. 1989).
243
See Michael L. Hartzmark et al., Fraud on the Market: Analysis of the Efficiency of the
Corporate Bond Market, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 654 (2001).
244
See id. at 689.
245
Id. (“[I]f information or opinions do not change each day, yet there is high
frequency of trading, this might be a sign that that security actually trades in an inefficient market that possibly resembles a casino.”).
246
See, e.g., Downing et al., supra note 214, at 1094 (“The results for hourly returns
in Panel B provide support for the notion that lower-rated bonds are more equity-like
and hence sensitive to firm-specific news.”).
247
Hartzmark et al., supra note 243, at 694–95.
248
In re HealthSouth Corp. Secs. Litig., 261 F.R.D. 616, 639 (N.D. Ala. 2009) (quoting Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1283 (D.N.J. 1989)).
242
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substantially composed of large QIBs, with trained staffs and substantial research capabilities that keep them well informed, ensure[ing]
the market is informationally efficient.”249 This is also evident in the
market for leveraged loans, commonly used as proxies in chapter 11
cramdowns, where lenders have ready access to a plethora of material
non-public information.250 Commentators have noted that the “monitoring role” of banks in this context may support a finding that loan
markets are efficient.251
The claim that secondary credit markets are efficient, however,
may break down in the context of small-cap firms. This distinction is
highly relevant because although large chapter 11 cases tend to receive
the most publicity, they are nonetheless relatively rare.252 The research
of Professors Eugene Fama and Kenneth French has shown that the
Capital Asset Pricing Model, closely linked with the assumptions of the
ECMH, fails to adequately predict returns for smaller firms.253 In appraisal proceedings in Delaware, courts have accepted the use of the
249

Newby v. Enron Corp., 529 F. Supp. 2d 644, 767 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
See STANDARD & POOR’S, supra note 235; see generally Edward I. Altman et al., Bank
Debt Versus Bond Debt: Evidence from Secondary Market Prices, J. MONEY CREDIT & BANK.,
June 2010, at 755.
251
A Deep Dive into Till v. SCS Credit Corp.—Part IX: The Loan Market Appears to
Satisfy Any Reasonable Standard for an Efficient Market, THE NECESSARY AND PROPER BLOG
(Jan. 3, 2014, 4:11 PM), http://thenecessaryandproperblog.
blogspot.com/2014/01/a-deep-dive-into-till-v-scs-credit-corp_6300.html (noting that
the Altman study “supports the thesis that the ‘monitoring’ role of the loan agreement’s covenants gives its holders better or at least more timely information and further that such information has value in terms of achieving a greater recovery for its
recipients”).
252
For example, the UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database notes that out
of 1039 cases sampled, only sixty-one companies had a total asset value of ten billion
dollars and over. Three hundred and ninety-two companies fell in the one to ten
billion dollar range. Nearly one-third of the cases sampled fell between $500 million
and $1 billion, while a slightly larger number contained assets less than $500 million.
UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database, UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW (Feb. 20, 2016, 12:08
PM), http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/design_a_study.asp. Mid-cap stocks are generally
defined as companies whose market value of equity exceeds two billion dollars. Rick
Wayman, Understanding Small- and Big-Cap Stocks, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/analyst/010502.asp (last visited May 7, 2016). Because the
assets of an insolvent company tend to greatly outweigh equity, a substantial portion
of the surveyed cases that fall in the one to ten billion dollar range are likely to be
considered “small-cap” companies. It should be noted that courts making determinations of a debt security’s efficiency tend to focus on the market value of a company’s
debt instead. Nonetheless, the general proposition that companies with a book value
of assets between one to ten billion dollars may be considered small-cap under certain
circumstances may still be applicable.
253
Eugene Fama & Kenneth French, Dissecting Anomalies, 63 J. FIN. 1653 (2008); but
see Cunningham, supra note 196, at 569 (“[I]n evaluating the ECMH, the need for a
pricing model creates the joint-hypothesis problem: one can never be certain in testing
250
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relevant “Ibbotson Premium” in order to reconcile this difference.254
This makes sense as many of the prerequisites for an efficient market
are no longer present in the realm of small and microcap companies.255
These companies tend to exhibit fewer trades, less liquidity, less transparency, less analyst coverage, and more susceptibility to market manipulation than their large-cap counterparts.256 In light of this, one
prominent corporate finance professor has noted that “the small firm
could be an important exception to the efficient market theory, an exception that gave investors the opportunity for consistently superior
returns over a period of two decades.”257 Indeed, courts have taken
market cap into consideration in securities regulation cases; a larger
market cap bodes in favor of a finding of efficiency.258
A second relevant market in a chapter 11 cramdown is the market
for distressed debt.259 The markets for such instruments may be less
likely to exhibit efficiency as the assumptions behind the ECMH break
down even further in this context. First, distressed debt investing tends
to be limited to a small group of investment professionals, most of

a model whether rejections of it are required because of market inefficiency or because
of an inadequately specified asset pricing model.”).
254
Cede & Co. v. JRC Acquisition Corp., No. 18648-NC, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 12,
at *31–32 (Del Ch. Feb. 10, 2004) (“Under CAPM the cost of equity is equal to the riskfree rate (the yield on 20 year Treasury bonds) plus a large company equity risk premium multiplied by the specific company adjusted beta for JR Cigar. Added to this
figure is an equity size premium. An equity size premium is added because smaller
companies have higher returns on average than larger ones . . . [and] small companies
have a higher cost of equity.”). Plugging a company’s beta into the CAPM tends to
produce a greater discrepancy with actual returns as the company’s market cap decreases.
255
See generally Microcap Stocks: A Guide for Investors, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/microcapstock.htm (last modified Sept. 18, 2013).
256
See id. (“Many microcap companies do not file financial reports with the SEC,
so it’s hard for investors to get the facts about the company’s management, products,
services, and finances.”).
257
BREALEY ET AL., supra note 55, at 364.
258
See, e.g., In re Petrobras Sec. Litig., 312 F.R.D. 354, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“Put
simply, Petrobras was one of the largest and most-analyzed firms in the world throughout the Class Period, and such size and sophistication raise the likelihood of an efficient market.”); Paul A. Ferrillo et al., The “Less Than” Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis: Requiring More Proof from Plaintiffs in Fraud-on-the-Market Cases, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
81, 101 (2004) (“[M]arket capitalization . . . may be an indicator of market efficiency
because there is a greater incentive for stock purchasers to invest in more highly capitalized corporations.”) (quoting Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 478 (N.D. Tex.
2001)). Moreover, the Hotchkiss study referenced supra note 232 analyzed a dataset
containing firms with a median book value of assets of $1820.2 million.
259
This definition includes both leveraged loans and distressed bonds/notes as secured bond issuances are becoming a more common method for distressed firms to
raise capital.
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whom attempt to “make money on mispriced assets.”260 This undermines the first assumption of the ECMH: a large number of market
participants. A robust market with a large number of participants may
more accurately reflect an informed consensus on the underlying
firm’s true value or credit risk, and the potential for pricing inefficiencies is greater when few informed participants are present. In fact, one
study on this issue concluded that junk bonds display relatively less efficiency than do investment grade bonds and tend to be issued in
smaller denominations.261 As suggested by this study, distressed debt
investors may be able to identify credit investments with artificially low
prices and high yields. Closely related to this factor is the ability of one
market participant to manipulate the market as a whole. This very nature of distressed debt investing makes this a plausible reality. The
emergence of credit default swaps (CDSs) has also altered many market participants’ incentives as investors may stand to gain by putting
downward pressure on a company’s bond price and forcing a company
into bankruptcy. While betting against a security occurs in all markets,
when one individual actor holds a sizable stake in a distressed firm, his
or her ability to affect the market price seems inconsistent with the
notion of an efficient market.
With respect to the primary market for syndicated loans to entities
similar to a chapter 11 debtor, the applicability of the ECMH is also
questionable.262 This is significant: in the line of cases employing the
two-part efficiency analysis, courts focus on the market for loans to borrowers similar to the debtor.263 In Momentive, for example, the court
specifically rejected the use of proposed exit facility rates as proxies.264
By definition, however, a primary market for debt does not involve any
260

Lubben, supra note 232. See also Downing et al., supra note 214, at 1101 (finding
that “stock returns predict returns on BBB- and junk-rated nonconvertible bonds at
both and hourly frequencies”). Such a conclusion is akin to a finding that the market
for distressed bonds may be inefficient.
261
See Downing et al., supra note 214, at 1086 (“Lower credit quality issuers tend to
be smaller firms—the average market capitalization of AAA issuers is about 70 times
larger than that of junk issuers.”).
262
See Newby v. Enron Corp., 529 F. Supp. 2d 644, 769 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (“There is
a line of cases conclusorily holding that primary bond markets per se are not open and
have not developed at all, and thus the theory should not apply.”). But see AAL High
Yield Bond Fund v. Ruttenberg, 229 F.R.D. 676, 684–85, 685 n.9 (N.D. Ala. 2005).
263
See, e.g., In re 20 Bayard Views, LLC, 445 B.R. 83, 109 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011)
(“[C]onsideration should be given to the ‘current market rates’ for loans that are ‘similar in term, quality of security, and risk of repayment or financial condition of the
borrower.’”) (quoting In re One Times Square Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 159 B.R. 695, 706
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993)).
264
In re MPM Silicones, LLC, No. 14-22503-rdd, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3926, at *85
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014).
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sort of trading mechanism by which yield rates can react to new information based on a large informed consensus of the marketplace.265
Creditors of distressed companies and firms in chapter 11 often wield
considerable influence in setting the loan’s terms and may base their
pricing models on factors unrelated to the loan itself.266 The Momentive
court noted that “[t]his should not be surprising because it is highly
unlikely that there will ever be an efficient market that does not include a profit element, fees and costs.”267
While it is certainly true that a secured creditor is entitled to a
positive return on its investment, the economic profit of the lender
should nonetheless be zero.268 One commentator has recently noted
that “[t]he key nuance is presumably market efficiency. The expected
economic profit for a loan issued in an efficient market is (near) zero
because the interest will just cover the opportunity cost of capital. The
expected economic profit in an inefficient market, on the other hand,
can be greater than zero.”269 Moreover, distressed business lenders may
implement market control by demanding a substantial premium over
investment-grade loans, imposing numerous restrictive covenants in
the credit agreement, wielding considerable control over the debtor’s
business, bargaining for options to convert the debt into common
stock, imposing numerous fees and other forms of consideration, and
aggressively pursuing default remedies such as the “loan to own strategy” commonly exerted by secured lenders in chapter 11.270 Additionally, the small number of market participants may ensure that the proposed rate exceeds the true risk of non-payment. If this were the case,
the present value of the future cash flows would exceed the amount of
the secured lender’s claim. While some commentators have put forth

265

See, e.g., Bromberg & Lowenfels Treatise, supra note 189, § 7.484(3) (“[N]ew
issue markets can rarely be efficient when they begin. They are one way [selling] rather than two way [buying and selling] markets. A single price is commonly fixed by
the underwriters and issuers, although usually with reference to the prevailing market
for similar securities.”).
266
See, e.g., STANDARD & POOR’S, supra note 235, at 15 (noting that “banks are driven
by the overall profitability of the issuer relationship, including noncredit revenue
sources”).
267
In re MPM Silicones, LLC, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3926, at *86.
268
Vitti, supra note 209, at 108–09 (discussing the distinction between accounting
profits and economic profits and how it pertains to the cramdown analysis).
269
Id. at 109.
270
See generally Log on Am. v. Promethean Asset Management, 223 F. Supp. 2d 435
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (distressed debtor-plaintiff entered into a “death spiral” convertible
credit agreement on highly unfavorable terms due to its inability procure financing
from any other market sources).
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compelling arguments that pricing loans based on market comparables may ensure that the primary market is efficient,271 the considerations discussed above should, at the bare minimum, call into question
whether these exit facilities for companies emerging from chapter 11
are as efficient as the broader market for syndicated loans.272
More fundamentally, many critics argue that the ECMH tends to
overlook the true nature of human behavior by assuming that all investors make decisions in a rational manner.273 These critics of the model
point to various financial bubbles as evidence that individuals often
overreact to material information.274 Such thinking can carry over to
the chapter 11 context, where investors’ fears of the potential instability of both pre- and post-confirmation debtors may lead to abnormally
high interest rates and erratic price movements. For example, when
Momentive’s replacement notes began trading, the yields immediately
rose to 6.2%.275 Whether this rate was a function of the debtor’s true
credit risk or a product of the market’s overreaction to the bench ruling is unclear. While the ECMH has been lauded as one of the greatest
achievements of modern financial theory, these psychological concerns have led one prominent corporate finance expert to note that
271

See, e.g., A Deep Dive into Till v. SCS Credit Corp.—Part IX: The Loan Market Appears to Satisfy Any Reasonable Standard for an Efficient Market, supra note 251 (“The best
evidence that the current US market for senior secured loans is efficient lies in the fact
that, when a bank is arranging a large secured loan of any size for a commercial client,
the arranger refers to comps in the loan market to estimate the pricing on the loan.”);
see also STANDARD & POOR’S, supra note 235, at 16 (noting that the use of mark-to-market
data has “made the [loan] market more transparent, improved price discovery and, in
doing so, made the market far more efficient and dynamic than it was in the past. In
the primary market, for instance, leveraged loan spreads are now determined not only
by rating and leverage profile, but also by trading levels of an issuer’s previous loans
and, often, bonds”).
272
See generally EDWARD I. ALTMAN & EDITH HOTCHKISS, CORPORATE FINANCIAL
DISTRESS AND BANKRUPTCY (3d ed. 2006) (“The structure of Chapter 11 . . . may discourage an active market for control of the assets of the bankrupt firm. Oversight
from the capital markets is reduced because management has access to debtor-in-possession financing. The securities of bankrupt firms trade infrequently . . . [p]erhaps
as a result, there is often limited analyst coverage. The absence of market forces makes
valuation more complex and sometimes less precise.”); STANDARD & POOR’S, supra note
235, at 15 (noting that with respect to non-institutional investors, “it is an anachronism
to continue to call [the primary market for loans] a ‘bank’ loan market”).
273
See, e.g., BREALEY ET AL., supra note 55, at 884–85 (“Some researchers believe that
the efficient-market hypothesis ignores important aspects of human behavior. For example, psychologists find that people tend to place too much emphasis on recent
events when they are predicting the future.”).
274
Id. at 885 (citing CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A
HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES (4th ed. 2000); ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL
EXUBERANCE (2d ed. 2000)).
275
Vitti, supra note 209, at 107.
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“[m]uch more research is needed before we have a full understanding
of why asset prices sometimes get so out of line with what appears to
be their discounted future payoffs.”276 These qualitative criticisms
should make one pause for a moment and consider whether bankruptcy judges should accept the theory within the context of a market
that has not experienced the same degree of empirical validation as
the more commonly studied equity markets.
3. Efficient Credit Markets and Till Footnote 14
The considerations discussed above call into question whether the
markets for loans to a company similar to a chapter 11 debtor can be
truly efficient. At the bare minimum, these considerations indicate
that since Till, bankruptcy courts should re-examine the way they view
the concept of market efficiency in light of the policy concerns outlined by the Supreme Court. As the court in Momentive articulated, the
“guiding principle” of Till is that the purpose of the discount rate is to
ensure that the present value of the secured lender’s future cash flows
equals its allowed secured claim. Accordingly, the relevant inputs in
the calculation are all factors contributing to the debtor’s default risk.
The ECMH is entirely consistent with this notion. As a result, the
proper inquiry should be similar to the one conducted by courts applying the Modified Cammer factors in the context of debt securities
fraud cases. Only by doing so can a court determine if market comparables paint an accurate picture of the debtor’s credit risk.
Even if courts were to conduct a proper efficient markets analysis,
however, the considerations discussed in Part V.B.2 indicate that such
an inquiry may rarely support a finding of efficiency. And as discussed
in Part IV, courts using the current standard more often than not conclude that there is no efficient market and ultimately apply the formula
approach. This creates a significant problem both in terms of judicial
resources drained and the financial burdens on a distressed debtor.
An ECMH-based analysis would likely result in a lower “success rate”
for the creditor and would be more costly for the parties, as the debtor
would have to hire an expert witness to analyze the Modified Cammer
factors. “Unfortunately, this determination can only be made after
both sides have exhausted considerable expenses to prove the presence of an efficient market, which may ultimately be ineffectual if the
court determines that the market is not controlling and falls back to
Till’s formula approach.”277 Such a result hardly seems desirable.

276
277

BREALEY ET AL., supra note 55, at 885.
Pill, supra note 4, at 295.
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Another consideration is that efficiency is not an “all or nothing”
concept. Courts have recognized that there are varying degrees to
which a debt security can be considered informationally efficient.278 In
light of this, courts have permitted plaintiffs in securities fraud cases
involving debt instruments to prevail on the efficiency analysis even
when they did not demonstrate that the security was perfectly efficient.279 Nonetheless, a crucial policy distinction is relevant in the 10b5 context: the importance of providing defrauded investors with an adequate remedy at law without requiring an overly-stringent pleading
threshold.280 Because this concern is not relevant in the chapter 11
context, it makes sense that a higher bar for efficiency should be implemented, since the whole point of the cramdown rate analysis is to
ensure the accuracy of the market rate. Such a consideration increases
the probability that a court will find the market proxies as inefficient.
The policy concern in the cramdown context is accuracy and not
providing plaintiffs with an easier way to satisfy a prima facie element.
In light of the above, the analysis conducted by courts following
Till footnote 14 seems inconsistent with the policies laid out in the Till
opinion, the Supreme Court’s definition of market efficiency, and the
Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis. Loans of a given duration and
risk comparable to those extended to borrowers exiting chapter 11
may not necessarily yield the most accurate “risk that [a default] will
occur.”281 Rather, they reflect unequal bargaining positions, transaction costs, information asymmetries, and other factors that violate the
ECMH. As a result, these interest rates may not be the most accurate
gauge of the debtor’s post-confirmation credit risk.
The above notwithstanding, it is important to note that the foregoing analysis is not meant to definitively suggest that credit markets
do not exhibit informational efficiency. Rather, the purpose of the
278

See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2414 (2014)
(“[M]arket efficiency is not a yes-or-no proposition.”); Newby v. Enron Corp., 529 F.
Supp. 2d 644, 750 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (“Efficiency is a relative concept, a matter of degree. As noted, the plaintiff need not satisfy all the Cammer/Unger/Bell factors to establish an efficient market even for stocks, and there is no absolute or established level
of evidence to demonstrate any of the factors, such as average weekly trading volume,
the number of analysts following the security, active market makers.”).
279
Newby, 529 F. Supp. 2d. at 750.
280
See id. at 749 (“Given the policy behind the federal securities laws of protecting
securities investors from fraud, the Court finds it unreasonable that merely because
bonds are not marketed in the same manner or as efficiently as stocks on national
exchanges, one must conclude that the bond market is inefficient and thus defrauded
bond investors should not have a right [to] use the fraud-on-the-market theory to permit them to pursue class action litigation.”).
281
Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 491 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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analysis is to point out some of relative inefficiencies that may exist in
distressed debt markets when compared to equity markets. As noted
by Justice Scalia in his Till dissent, eight of the Justices agreed that the
purpose of the cramdown rate was to compensate the creditor for the
risk of non-payment. The only area of disagreement was which method
produced the most accurate result. It may very well be true that the
formula approach may undercompensate creditors in certain circumstances. As argued above, however, it may be just as likely that a market-based approach will yield the same sort of inaccuracies. In sum,
this section of the Comment has argued that: (1) the purpose of the
cramdown rate is to ensure that the present value of the secured creditor’s future cash flows is equal to 100% of the allowed secured claim;
(2) the potential uncertainty with respect to the efficiency of these
market rates means that the present value calculation may exceed
100%; and (3) in light of these potential flaws, courts should continue
to apply a risk-adjusted cramdown rate until the efficiency of the primary and secondary markets for debt instruments is further validated.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the years after Till, courts across the country continued to apply
different approaches to determine a cramdown rate in chapter 11
cases. The two predominant methods that emerged are the formula
approach and the two-step coerced loan approach. Courts applying
the latter have tended to rely on Till footnote 14 as the guidepost for
their analysis. The public policy concerns outlined in the main body
of the Till opinion, however, should outweigh the influence of footnote 14. Cramdown rates exist to put a secured lender in the same
position as one who receives a lump sum paying in satisfaction of his
claim, not to help him capture additional profits. Moreover, as noted
by Justice Thomas in his Till dissent, there is no fundamental difference between the rate determination process in chapter 11 and chapter 13. Furthermore, adjusting the discount rate upward alleviates
many financial burdens on the debtor and best comports with the
bankruptcy court’s task of evaluating the feasibility of a debtor-in-possession’s plan for reorganization. Such an approach will maximize a
corporate debtor’s chances of successfully emerging from bankruptcy.
When viewed in conjunction with public policy considerations,
the Supreme Court’s endorsement of the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis in Basic Inc. indicates that the ECMH may be the fundamental
underpinning of footnote 14. Whether this was the Justices’ intended
meaning or not, such a definition makes sense in light of the overall
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purpose of the cramdown interest rate. The small size of a typical chapter 11 debtor, imperfect bargaining positions of a lender and a distressed borrower, and a small number of market participants all suggest that the market for credit to companies in chapter 11 may never
truly be “efficient” as defined by the Supreme Court in Basic Inc. The
fact that a market for loans to similar debtors exists does not justify its
use as cramdown proxy, particularly in light of the fact that a plurality
of the Supreme Court patently rejected the contention that lenders
should be allowed to reap the same profit they could have obtained by
investing in leveraged loans to entities similar to the debtor. It follows
that the two-step approach endorsed by American HomePatient will
rarely yield a result consistent with the ECMH and the Supreme
Court’s reasoning.
For the reasons discussed above, the formula approach as articulated in Till and Momentive should be the standard method for determining cramdown rates in chapter 11. Such an approach is most consistent with Till’s fundamental principal, footnote 14, the policy
behind the Bankruptcy Code, and modern financial theory.

